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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
INVESTORS‘ REACTIONS TO COMPETITIVE ACTIONS AMONG RIVALS: A 
STEP TOWARD STRATEGIC ASSET PRICING THEORY 
 
This dissertation describes the development and empirical testing of strategic as-
set pricing theory (STRAPT). This explains the processes by which investors form ideas 
and judgments about a given firm‘s competitive strategy, and their ultimate belief about 
the impact these strategies will have on the firm‘s future stock price. My model explicitly 
accounts for information investors associate with dimensions of a firm‘s pattern of com-
petitive actions, how investors process and interpret this information, and how they form 
opinions about the relationship between competitive strategy and future value of the 
firm‘s equity shares. Thus, by accounting for observed competitive behavior, my model 
stands in stark contrast to asset pricing theory – which asserts that financial markets are 
efficient and all investors rational – and instead sides with Hirshleifer (2001) who con-
tends some investors form biases, and that the next stage of asset pricing theory is to look 
at how investors form opinions about stocks. Drawing from some unique theoretical 
areas: information perception/salience, information processing, social judgment, and de-
cision making, my dissertation develops a conceptual model of this process by which 
long-buyers and short-sellers view and react to patterns of competitive actions carried out 
among rivals. 
My findings about how long-buyers regard between-firm ―differences‖ in the pat-
tern of competitive actions the firm carries out over time, or strategic heterogeneity, are 
generally supportive of Miller and Chen (1996), who posited that distinctive processes 
such as heterogeneous strategies may decrease the ―legitimacy‖ of the firm. They exhibit 
a negative relationship with stock returns. Due to a different decision-making process, 
short-sellers come to different conclusions. Strategic heterogeneity exhibits a U-shaped 
relationship with short interest. My findings pertaining to how long-buyers value the 
number of strategic moves carried out by a firm generally support Young, Smith, and 
Grimm (1996) and Ferrier (2001). Specifically, I demonstrate that these investors value 
exposure to a firm, and this translates into positive stock market returns. Short-sellers, on 
the other hand, see the value of a large number of strategic actions only to an extent. 
Through their systematic analysis, they subscribe to the Porter (1980) and Shamsie 
(1990) viewpoint that more is not always better. This results in a U-shaped relationship 
with short interest. 
 
KEYWORDS: asset pricing theory; behavioral finance; cognitive psychology; competi-
tive dynamics; decision-making 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Future earnings of any firm are difficult to forecast; however, estimates of this po-
tential are a key aspect of valuing a firm‘s equity shares. How is this done? What do in-
vestors evaluate to forecast this future earnings capability? And who are these investors? 
Do they all think the same way and arrive at similar conclusions? This dissertation seeks 
to take a step toward incorporating neurofinance into strategy research by addressing the 
question: What do investors think? 
Finance and strategy scholars have turned extensively to ―traditional‖ measures of 
performance such as return on assets or earnings per share to forecast future performance. 
However, I believe that investors, those with the most at stake in valuing equity shares, 
scrutinize factors other than these conventional evaluation measures. I propose that they 
look at strategy, in particular competitive strategy—or the interaction of competitive 
moves between firms. I think investors scan, analyze, and interpret the value-creating po-
tential associated with the competitive interaction—the pace, intensity, and pattern of dy-
namic competitive rivalry—in a given industry. Thus, rivalry may be viewed as an under-
explored component of stock valuations whereby competitive strategy is defined and cha-
racterized as the unfolding of competitive moves carried out by rivals in strategic time. 
In the context of competitive interaction ―… misinterpretation [by rivals] of the 
intended moves of the competitor is a constant hazard‖ (Bettis and Weeks 1987, 552, 
brackets added). Investors also deal with this same interpretive risk. I believe that these 
investors appraise, to some extent, the patterns associated with the interplay of each ri-
val‘s competitive moves, and consider these questions: (1) How different are the compa-
ny‘s competitive patterns from those of rivals? (2) How difficult is it to understand a 
company‘s competitive patterns compared with rivals‘ patterns? (3) How visible is the 
company on the ―radar screen‖ every day as compared with the visibility of the referent 
competition? For example, Bettis and Weeks (1987) found that although both Kodak‘s 
and Polaroid‘s market value declined during the 1976–1977 time period, Kodak‘s losses 
were greater than Polaroid‘s. Why? What did Polaroid do to outperform Kodak? At the 
beginning of the observation period, investors apparently conjectured that Kodak would 
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fend off Polaroid‘s attacks on its market position. However, these attacks exposed some 
of Kodak‘s weaknesses. The investment community, interpreting the Kodak–Polaroid 
battle as it unfolded, adjusted Kodak‘s future earnings estimates downward. So the cen-
tral question my study proposes to answer is how these investors come to conclusions 
about the viability of the pattern of a firm‘s competitive moves in contributing to future 
earnings growth. More important, do all investors think alike and come to the same con-
clusion? The ―efficient markets hypothesis‖ from finance tells us that they do. I will ar-
gue otherwise. 
According to the efficient markets hypothesis—a key tenet of asset pricing 
theory—financial markets are ―informationally efficient.‖ That is, prices on traded assets, 
for example, stocks and bonds, already reflect all known information and therefore are 
unbiased in the sense that they incorporate the collective beliefs of all investors about fu-
ture prospects (Fama 1970). However, scholars working in the area of behavioral finance 
have recently begun to question the efficient markets hypothesis. Indeed, this emerging 
field has shown that a myriad of factors affect how investors form opinions about stocks, 
from the home country of the equity in question to the amount of sunlight in the city 
where the exchange on which the stock is listed is located (Hirshleifer 2001). This im-
plies that not all investors always act rationally. In fact, when a stock is purchased by one 
investor, an investor on the other side of the transaction is selling the security, indicating 
that the investors do not have the same opinion as the efficient markets hypothesis would 
espouse. What leads to these differing opinions? The following excerpt demonstrates a 
possible cause (Business Week, August 5, 1996): 
Manuel Asensio … who runs Asensio & Co., a New York hedge fund, is a 
rarity among short-sellers, for he is anything but secretive…Asensio has 
shared his views with the message boards of America Online Inc., where 
they are welcomed. But Wall Street is another matter. Asensio and other 
shorts complain that brokerage analysts and fund managers have a un-
iformly hostile attitude and are loath to even return their calls. ―I would 
love for someone to call me and tell me that a stock that I own is a piece of 
s---,‖ says Asensio. ―But I‘ll talk to some pension-fund manager who 
owns $4 million of some stock, which he bought with employee money. 
I‘ll tell him something is wrong with the company—and he gets emotion-
al! It is ridiculous. It is irresponsible.‖ 
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The above quotation highlights two classes of investors—long-buyers and short-
sellers—who apply very different cognitive processes to the selection of stocks they want 
to buy, hold, or sell. Long-buyers are those who buy a stock with the expectation that the 
price of the shares will go up. Short-sellers, on the other hand, borrow shares of a stock 
and sell them on the open market with the expectation that the share price will go down. 
In many cases, these are shares in the same company. Thus, consistent with views in be-
havioral finance, various classes of investors incorporate relevant or public information 
differently, leading to conflicting assessments of the value of a corporation‘s equity 
shares, and possibly even mispricing the equity shares. 
Hirshleifer (2001, 1533) contended that the ―great missing chapter in asset-pricing 
theory … is a model of the process by which people form and transmit ideas about mar-
kets and securities.‖ Thus, the goal of my dissertation is to develop a model of this 
process for long-buyers and short-sellers in the arena of strategic management. My cen-
tral research design synthesizes theories from competitive dynamics with ideas from so-
cial judgment theory and cognitive psychology to extend a subset of asset pricing theory 
that explores the distinct decision-making processes of these two classes of investors 
when evaluating competitive strategies. 
I develop and empirically test STRategic Asset Pricing Theory (STRAPT) with a 
model of the processes by which investors form ideas about firms‘ competitive strategies 
and their ultimate belief about the impact these strategies will have on stock prices. Spe-
cifically, I unify several areas of psychological thought that have yet to be cohesively ap-
plied to investor decision-making. Interlinking these diverse theoretical viewpoints caus-
es a new theory to emerge that provides both a platform for testing new empirical rela-
tionships and a framework within which to analyze problems related to investor decision-
making. Globally, STRAPT has four stages presented in chronological order as if viewed 
as a framework. First, I describe the overall decision-making process as informed by so-
cial judgment theory. This theory describes how individuals process pieces of informa-
tion, or ―cues‖ and infer outcomes based on these cues. Second, I explain the manner in 
which investors ―code‖ this information as evidenced by information theory. This theory 
posits that people have strong propensities to discover patterns in sequences of events 
presented by the environment along continuums such as complexity-simplicity, and to 
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use these patterns to predict positive or negative future outcomes. Third, I describe what 
makes these patterns of cues salient to investors. Fourth, I make predictions as to the ex-
tent to which the competitive information is processed using heuristic versus systematic 
decision-making models. Heuristic decision-making requires less effort, and people often 
use heuristic choice rules when they have large amounts of information to process. When 
the stakes are high, people generally use a more effortful, or systematic decision-making 
process. I then hypothesize as to how the combination of these cognitive principles leads 
to evaluations of corporate strategies by long-buyers and short-sellers based on their in-
terpretation of the patterns they see. Thus, I incorporate the information investors consid-
er, how they process and interpret this information, and how they form opinions about 
whether these strategic patterns will positively or negatively affect the future value of 
corporations‘ equity shares. 
In addition to studying long-buyers, I have chosen to examine the decision 
processes and actions of short-sellers. According to scholars in finance, these investors 
are the most informed investors because of the high cost and significant risk involved in 
shorting stocks (Diamond and Verrechia 1987). Evaluation of the mental processes and 
actions of this group of investors is unprecedented in strategy research and is of utmost 
importance because they have more information, and short interest (the number of shares 
sold short relative to the outstanding float) is a variable that finance scholars have shown 
to have a devastating impact on stock prices (Dechow, Hutton, Meulbruck, and Sloan 
2001). Conceptually, the construct of short interest represents investors negative specula-
tion of the potential downside risk of a firm‘s equity shares. A critical element of this fu-
ture potential is the stance the company takes in the marketplace as exhibited by the stra-
tegic moves it carries out. 
I believe that because short-sellers incur higher cost and risk, they use this more 
thorough or systematic decision-making process (Chaiken 1980) as compared with long-
buyers. The long-buyer, faced with less to lose, excessive amounts of information, and 
considerable time constraints, will resort to the more efficient heuristic-based decision-
making process (Tversky and Kahneman 1974) where the buyer relies on cognitive short-
cuts to avoid the cost of complex information processing. I predict that, in contrast to the 
central tenets of the efficient markets hypothesis, which supposes that all investors act 
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―rationally‖ (or in the same manner), the different decision-making processes of long-
buyers and short-sellers will lead to different evaluations of the extent to which various 
strategies will enhance or diminish a firm‘s worth. Thus, stock valuations are indeed in-
fluenced by disparate investor perceptions of competitive behavior manifest in the com-
plexity and differentiated patterns in the competitive moves carried out among rivals. My 
model is depicted in Figure 1 below: 
 
Figure 1  
 
 
I begin by providing a detailed review of short-selling and asset pricing theory, as 
these concepts are new to strategy and key components of STRAPT. I then discuss the 
field of competitive dynamics, as it is the cornerstone of STRAPT. I subsequently devel-
op the theoretical framework of investor psychology and explain how I chose to charac-
terize strategies, why investors should find the various measures of competitive strategy 
to be salient, and why these various types of strategies prompt investors to develop posi-
tive or, more important, negative opinions of a given firm‘s strategy as it unfolds. I pro-
ceed with my hypotheses, model and data descriptions, results, and concluding remarks 
that justify why exploration of this phenomenon is important to the field of strategy as a 
whole, and competitive dynamics in particular. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
BACKGROUND ON SHORT SELLING 
Short-selling in finance and commerce is a form of speculation based on anticipa-
tion of a decline in the prices of securities and commodities. This type of selling occurs 
most frequently in connection with the sale of securities on stock markets. Short-sellers 
sell stocks that they do not own but have borrowed, instead, from a brokerage house, 
generally a large institutional investor or broker-dealer. For example, an investor who 
wants to sell short 100 shares of a company, believing the shares are overpriced and that 
their price will fall, will borrow the shares and promise to return them later. The investor 
then sells the borrowed shares at the current market price. If the price of the shares drops, 
the investor ―covers the short position‖ by buying back the shares and returning them to 
the lender. The profit is the difference between the price at which the stock was sold and 
the cost to buy it back, minus commissions and expenses for borrowing the stock. How-
ever, if the price of the shares increases, the potential losses are unlimited. The compa-
ny‘s shares may continue to rise, and at some point the investor has to replace the 100 
shares he or she sold. As Figure 2 illustrates, if an investor sold Google stock short at its 
inception in August of 2004 for $100, by December of that year if the investor covered, 
or bought the shares back, that investor would have lost almost $100 per share. 
Say the investor thought that by hanging on to the short position for just a while 
longer the stock would come back down. Figure 3 demonstrates that the investor would 
never have made money, but if the investor covered the investment in December of last 
year, the investor‘s loss would have been $600 per share, or six times the value of the 
stock in the first place. 
This demonstrates that losses can mount without limit until the short position is 
covered. For this reason, short-selling is a very risky technique that investors would not 
undertake lightly. 
The impetus for examining the characteristics of companies that have a large 
amount of their stock shorted is quite compelling. Dechow et al. (2001) found that for 
firms with no short positions, the average one-year-ahead abnormal return is 2.3%, while 
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for firms with over 5% shorted, the average abnormal return is negative 18.1%. For each 
of the categories with short positions, the average abnormal return is significantly lower 
than the average abnormal return for the firm-years with no short positions (the authors 
sort firm-years into six categories based on the magnitude of the short position in the 
stock). 
Figure 2 
 
Adapted from CNBC.com 
 
Figure 3 
 
Adapted from CNBC.com 
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Ancillary to the impact on stock price is that information from short sales is ex-
tremely important as a valuation tool because it quickly disseminates information about 
negative investor perceptions of corporate strategies. Analyst over-optimism is well do-
cumented in the finance literature. Lin and McNichols (1997) found that analysts whose 
employers have underwriting relationships with a company—relationships in which fi-
nancial services such as initial public offerings are offered for a fee—issue more favora-
ble investment recommendations than do unaffiliated analysts. Francis and Philbrick 
(1993) suggested that analysts want to maintain favor with management because man-
agement is a source of analyst information. In addition, McNichols and O‘Brien (1997) 
documented that analysts infrequently issue sell recommendations. So, in some cases, 
short sales are the only method by which to obtain potential negative information, which 
is ultimately parlayed into decreased company valuations. 
Because of the high risk involved with short-selling, and because of its putative 
potential for manipulating stock prices, short-selling is heavily regulated in U.S. stock 
markets and is not allowed in many foreign stock markets. In addition, the fund charters 
for many institutional investors prohibit them from selling short or restrict the size of 
their short positions relative to the overall size of their portfolios. However, the growing 
popularity of hedge funds (unregulated funds that hedge long positions with a significant 
amount of short-selling), has led to skyrocketing short-selling. As Figure 4 demonstrates, 
short sales have increased 20-fold in the last 20 years. In fact, short sales are having such 
an impact on markets that the Financial Times recently reported that a Senate banking 
panel is holding hearings to investigate how the explosive growth of hedge funds is in-
fluencing financial markets. 
Regulation in the United States has developed because of the considerable dam-
age to stock prices short-sellers can cause, and short-sellers ―remain reviled today by cor-
porate managers‖ (Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter 2005). SEC rules allow investors to sell 
short only on an uptick or a zero-plus tick
1
 (the stock price has increased), to prevent 
                                                 
1
 According to the tick test, the security can be sold short at a price that is higher than the last trade (i.e., the 
short sale can be the uptick) or at the same price as the previous trade (zero uptick) if the previous trade 
was executed at a higher price than the trade that preceded it. Effectively, if the last trade prior to the short 
sale was a downtick or a zerotick (e.g., following a trade at $100, the last trade was executed at $100 or be-
low) then the short-sale must be executed as an uptick, at a price higher than $100. On the other hand, if the 
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―pool operators‖ from driving down a stock price through heavy short-selling, then buy-
ing the shares for a large profit. These regulations act to further increase the cost of short-
selling. 
Figure 4 
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Thus, because short sales are sharply rising and severely affect stock prices and 
because sellers more closely analyze firm characteristics than buyers do, it is essential 
that strategy scholars flesh out which aspects of strategic and managerial characteristics 
prompt short-sellers to establish positions. In fact, the evidence that short-sellers are the 
most informed investors is so pervasive, Francis, Venkatachalam, and Zhang (2005) 
state: 
…it is not unreasonable to think that analysts‘ revisions are a response to 
the information conveyed by short positions. Alternatively, analysts‘ revi-
sions may be a response to a more direct signal conveyed by the short sel-
ler to analysts. [The authors subsequently empirically prove these supposi-
tions.] 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
last trade is an uptick (e.g., following a trade at $100, the last trade was at $101.5) than the short-sale can 
be a zerotick, which means that it can be executed at the same price as the last trade. 
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Mechanisms of a Short Sale 
When a broker facilitates the delivery of a client‘s short-sale, the client is charged 
a fee for this service. The fee is typically accrued daily and charged monthly, starting on 
the day that the short-sale settles and concluding on the day that the short position is 
―closed out.‖ This adds incremental ―short financing cost‖ to the strategy of short-selling, 
and therefore decreases the profit potential of short-selling. It should also be noted that 
contrary to standard finance theory, the short-seller often does not enjoy the benefits of 
the proceeds of the short-sale, but generally the revenue is escrowed as collateral for the 
owner of the borrowed shares. Typically, the short-seller receives interest on the 
proceeds, but the rate received (the ―rebate‖) is below the market rate. Regulation T, set 
by the Federal Reserve, requires short-sellers of stocks to deposit additional collateral of 
50% of the market value of the shorted shares. If the price of the shorted stock rises, in-
creasing the liability of the short-seller, additional collateral funds are generally required. 
The tax treatment of short positions contributes to the high cost of short-selling. All prof-
its from a short-sale are taxed at the short-term capital gains rate, no matter how long the 
short position is open. Finally, the short-seller is required to reimburse the stock lender 
for any dividends or other distributions paid to the shareholders of the shorted stock while 
the short position is open. Because the ex-dividend stock price of the shorted stock is 
generally higher than the pre-dividend stock price less the amount of the dividend (Frank 
and Jagannathan 1998), dividend reimbursement represents a real cost to the short-seller 
(in addition to inconvenience and transactions costs). 
Adding further to the risk is that the standard stock-lending practice requires the 
loan to be repaid on demand. This practice exposes short-sellers to the risk of being 
―squeezed.‖ A short-squeeze occurs when the lender of the borrowed shares wants to sell 
the stock. If the short-seller is unable to find an alternative lender, the short-seller must 
repurchase the shares in the open market to repay the loan and close the position, known 
as ―buy-in‖ risk. To avoid this risk, a short-seller can borrow on a term basis for an addi-
tional fee, but most short-sellers seem to prefer the risk of a squeeze to the cost of a term 
loan, and term loans are rare. To help short-sellers assess the probability of a squeeze, the 
broker will sometimes reveal the identity of the lender of the shorted stock. Generally, a 
short-squeeze is less likely for more liquid securities, such as large market-capitalization 
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stocks with high institutional ownership, because it is easier for brokers to find alternative 
lenders of such stocks if the original lender demands the return of the borrowed shares. 
This review serves to illustrate the considerable expense and risk associated with 
short-selling as opposed to establishing a long position. As a result, Diamond and Verre-
chia (1987) suggested that short-sellers will not trade unless they expect the price to fall 
enough to compensate them for the additional costs and risks of shorting. Short-sellers 
are therefore more motivated to be better informed than are investors with long positions. 
This suggests that short-sellers more closely analyze all elements of a firm including the 
strategic posture, characteristics of the top management team, and real options portfolio 
than long-buyers do, making short-sellers more capable of predicting the future revenue-
producing capability of a given set of firm characteristics. While the finance scholars 
have appropriately looked only at financial ratios that prompt short-sellers to establish a 
position, short-sellers look at all aspects of the firm. 
Literature Review 
Prior theories of the effect of short interest on stock prices have incorporated the 
information contained in short-sales. Three fundamental views have been offered on the 
information content of short interest, each with different implications for pricing (Desai, 
Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and Balachandran 2002). The most commonly held view is that 
high short-interest is a negative signal since short-selling is costly and more likely to ori-
ginate from informed traders with adverse information (Diamond and Verrecchia 1987). 
The second view, ―no relation theory,‖ argues that short interest is primarily because of 
hedging, tax-related issues, and/or arbitrage strategies; thus, it has no significant negative 
or positive signals (Brent, Morse, and Stice 1990). The third hypothesis, the ―positive re-
lation,‖ argues that high short interest signals a future demand pressure as short-sellers 
eventually have to cover their position, which puts an upward pressure on the stock price 
(Epstein 1995; Byrnes 1995). 
Early short-interest studies failed to identify a strong relationship between short 
interest and abnormal returns, and reasoned that most short-selling is because of arbitrage 
or hedging (Figlewski 1981; Woolridge and Dickinson 1994). Figlewski and Webb 
(1993) found increased short-selling around option introductions as option writers hedge 
their position in the underlying stock. The authors did, however, find small negative 
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excess returns in stocks without traded options. Senchack and Starks (1993) suggested 
that index futures arbitrage accounts for most short-selling, but also reported small nega-
tive abnormal returns in optioned stocks around short interest announcements. Brent, et 
al. (1990) found little evidence of speculative-based short selling and instead stressed the 
prevalence of tax-based and arbitrage-related short sales. However, Asquith and Meul-
broek (1996) demonstrated that the sample selections of previous studies are not based on 
the magnitude of the short interests and, as such, the power of the tests in these studies 
was weak. These authors pointed out that many firms have very small short positions 
(less than 0.5%). These small short positions are likely to represent hedge positions, ra-
ther than a systematic attempt to exploit perceived overpricing. By focusing on a sample 
of firm-years with large short interests (e.g., firm-years with short positions greater than 
2.5% of shares outstanding), Asquith and Meulbroek (1996) documented a strong and 
consistent relation between short interests and excess returns. They established that 
stocks for firms listed on the NYSE and AMEX with high levels of short interest signifi-
cantly underperform relative to comparable stocks without short positions. Desai et al. 
(2002) presented critical supporting evidence for negative abnormal returns on highly 
shorted stock portfolios. They created equal-weighted highly shorted Nasdaq stock port-
folios and, after controlling for market, size, book-to-market, and momentum factors, do-
cumented roughly negative 1% abnormal monthly returns. They also demonstrated that 
heavily shorted firms are more likely to be delisted compared with the controls. Two re-
cent papers also look at daily short-sales and subsequent returns on the Australian and 
Nasdaq stock markets. Aitken, Frino, McCorry, and Swan (1998) presented international 
evidence that instantaneous negative information is signaled by short-sales on the Aus-
tralian stock market, where short interest information is available in real time. The 
second, by Angel, Christophe, and Ferri (2003), used proprietary Nasdaq data over a 
three-month period from September 13 through December 12, 2000. Both papers showed 
that high daily short-sales are followed quickly by negative abnormal returns. Finally, in 
their event study of the announcement effects of monthly short interest, Senchack and 
Starks (1993) found that changes in short sales are followed by negative abnormal re-
turns. 
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These papers influenced the view that short-sellers are informed, thus contributing 
to the widely held belief that high short interest stocks underperform. Empirical evidence 
consistent with the view that at least some short-sellers are informed includes Dechow et 
al. (2001),who demonstrated that short-sellers on the NYSE and AMEX exchanges posi-
tion themselves in stocks with low book-to-market ratios, and that they are able to distin-
guish low ratios because of temporarily low fundamentals (such as cash flow, earnings, 
and book value) to stock price. This evidence is consistent with short-sellers using the in-
formation in these ratios in anticipation of lower future returns. Using proprietary Nasdaq 
data, Christophe, Ferri and Angel (2004) examined short-sales transactions in the five 
days prior to earnings announcements of 913 Nasdaq-listed firms. They found that short 
selling increases substantially in these stocks prior to unfavorable earnings announce-
ments. Also, they indicated that short-sellers typically are more active in stocks with low 
book-to-market valuations. However, they demonstrated that the levels of pre-
announcement short-selling mostly appear to reflect firm-specific information rather than 
these fundamental financial characteristics, indicating that short-sellers have company-
specific information that leads them to believe that operational aspects of a given compa-
ny are not sufficient to meet analysts‘ earnings-estimates forecasts. 
Arnold, Butler, Crack, and Zhang (2005) added generalizability to these findings 
by extending the Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) model to include short-selling against 
the box,
2
 and tested the extended model using a natural experiment based around the 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97). Prior to TRA97, a short sale against the box al-
lowed investors to eliminate their exposure to an appreciated financial position and pre-
serve a capital gain while postponing the capital gains tax until a later tax year. TRA97 
eliminated the tax benefits of short-selling against the box. The authors demonstrated that 
when a short-sale of this nature occurs, it is a result of relatively informed traders with 
negative expectations, rather than because of motivations. By exploiting an exogenous 
                                                 
2
 A short-sale against the box is a transaction in which a trader holding a long position in an asset sells the 
same asset short but does not immediately deliver the long position to cover the short sale. This allows the 
trader to neutralize his or her exposure to fluctuations in stock price without liquidating the long position. 
Thus, unlike a regular short-sale, which leaves the short-seller with negative exposure to the stock, a short-
sale against the box leaves the trader with zero net exposure to the stock. Prior to the Taxpayer Relief Act 
of 1997 (TRA97), a short-sale against the box allowed investors to eliminate their exposure to an appre-
ciated financial position and preserve a capital gain while postponing the capital gains tax until a later tax 
year. 
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event as a natural experiment, the authors were able to demonstrate that the costs of 
short-selling increase the negative information content of short interest announcements in 
general, rather than for just a subset of stocks, such as those that have high levels of short 
interest, no traded options (Senchack and Starks 1993), or an introduction of traded op-
tions (Danielson and Sorescu 2001). 
From a practitioner‘s standpoint, a survey of fund managers supports the notion 
that short interest is bad news for stocks. In a memo to clients, Principal Kevin Johnson 
of Aronson, Johnson, and Ortiz, LP, a Philadelphia-based firm that manages $15 billion 
in institutional assets, wrote: ―In a nutshell, higher levels of short interest—and increases 
therein—bode poorly for future stock returns, all else equal.‖ 
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ASSET PRICING THEORY AND BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 
With the start of a new quarter, Wall Street seems to have found something it badly 
needed: a major shift in sentiment. ―Sentiment is the whole story, and what we’re seeing 
is an improvement in sentiment,‖ said Alfred Goldman, chief market strategist at Wacho-
via Securities. (AP Newswire , April 6, 2008). 
 
Before psychological research applications appeared in finance research, only ra-
tional financial theory applied, stating that market investors are rational, thus incorporat-
ing all relevant and available information. Fierce competition among investors induces 
the desired market equilibrium, whereby stock prices reflect only the risk-adjusted dis-
counted value of expected cash flows. However, as the above quotation suggests, inves-
tors are not always rational, and sentiment can be a powerful force driving stock prices. 
Since prospect theory was introduced (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and 
Kahneman 1992), psychology research has integrated investor sentiment into financial 
research as irrationality. Investors exposed to some information in the market will behave 
irrationally and under-react or over-react, thus deviating from market equilibrium. 
The basic equation of asset pricing can be written as follows: 
 
P it  = E t  [M 1t X 1, ti ] 
 
where P it  is the price of an asset i at time t ―today,‖ E t  is the conditional expectations 
operator conditioning on today‘s information, X 1, ti  is the random payoff on asset i at 
time t +1 (tomorrow), and M 1t  is the stochastic discount factor, or SDF. The SDF is a 
random variable whose realizations are always positive. It generalizes the familiar notion 
of a discount factor to a world of uncertainty; if there is no uncertainty, or if investors are 
risk neutral, the SDF is just a constant that converts expected payoffs tomorrow into val-
ue today. The behavioral elements explored by finance scholars and strategic asset pric-
ing theory are contained in the E t  portion of the equation, or the expectations operator. 
Over the past several years, theoretical and empirical developments in asset pric-
ing have taken place within a well-established paradigm. This paradigm emphasizes a 
state price exists (or price of the assets today) for each state of nature at each date, and 
the market price of any financial asset is just the sum of its expected future payoffs, E t . 
Recent developments in behavioral finance, which emphasize nonstandard preferences or 
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irrational expectations, can be understood within this paradigm in that the expected future 
payoffs will vary based on the cognitive models of various investors. 
Behavioral finance seeks to supplement the standard theories of finance by intro-
ducing behavioral aspects to the decision-making process. Contrary to the Markowitz and 
Sharpe approach, behavioral finance deals with individuals and the different ways they 
gather and use information. Some of the focus is on cognitive biases, which include heu-
ristics, or rules of thumb that make decision-making easier; however, these biases can 
lead to suboptimal investment decisions (Hirshleifer 2001). For example, when faced 
with N choices for how to invest retirement money, many people allocate using the 1/N 
rule. If there are three funds, one-third goes into each. If two are stock funds, two-thirds 
go into equities. If one of the three is a stock fund, one-third goes into equities. Recently, 
Benartzi and Thaler (2001) have documented that many people follow the 1/N rule. 
Behavioral finance has been one of the most active areas in asset pricing in recent 
years. Models in this arena contain two key elements. First, they postulate nonstandard 
behavior, driven by irrationality or nonstandard preferences, on the part of at least some 
investors. Second, they assume that rational investors with standard preferences are li-
mited in their desire or ability to offset the asset demands of the first group of investors. 
This means that irrational expectations or nonstandard preferences affect the prices of fi-
nancial assets. 
A number of papers have explored the consequences of relaxing the assumption 
that investors have rational expectations, much of it in the area of reactions to stock divi-
dends. For example, Barsky and De Long (1993) showed that rapid dividend growth in-
creases stock prices more than proportionally, indicating overreaction of stock prices to 
dividend news, or the value effect—the perception that stocks with higher dividend 
payouts are more valuable. Other work in the behavioral area includes Hong and Stein 
(1999), who asserted that there are two types of irrational investors. The first, news-
watchers, receive private signals about fundamental value, which diffuse gradually 
through the news-watching population. These investors form price expectations based on 
the signals the news items confer, but are imperfectly rational in that they do not learn 
from market prices. Momentum investors have no private information and trade on the 
basis of the most recent change in price. These investors are imperfectly rational in that 
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they do not trade optimally based on the entire history of price changes. The interaction 
between these two groups produces both a momentum effect, as private information 
gradually affects prices and is reinforced by momentum trading, and a value effect, as 
momentum investors drive prices beyond fundamental value. This is further examined by 
a study in the marketing arena that suggests that consumers use heuristics such as the hot 
hand and the gambler’s fallacy and decide to buy or sell stocks based on their past per-
formance. More specifically, consumers (wrongly) use sequential information about past 
performance of assets to make suboptimal decisions. They sell ―losers‖ and buy ―win-
ners‖ leading to mispricing on the stock market for winning stocks. A recent marketing 
study found that mutual funds capitalize on these biases by advertising positive past per-
formance‖ (Johnson and Tellis 2005). 
Modigliani and Cohn (1979) demonstrated that another form of irrationality is a 
failure to understand the difference between real and nominal magnitudes. They showed 
that investors suffer from inflation illusion, in effect discounting real cash flows at no-
minal interest rates. Ritter and Warr (1999) and Sharpe (1999) argued that inflation illu-
sion may have led investors to bid up stock prices, as inflation has declined since the ear-
ly 1980s. According to Campbell, (2000), an interesting issue raised by this literature is 
whether misvaluation is caused by a high level of inflation, in which case it is unlikely to 
be important today, or whether it is caused by changes in inflation from historical 
benchmark levels, in which case it may contribute to high current levels of stock prices. 
While it is impossible to be comprehensive on a topic of this scope, Hirshleifer 
(2001) pointed out several incidences of investor biases that contradict the efficient mar-
kets hypothesis and impact asset prices. For example, environmental factors that influ-
ence mood are correlated with stock price movements. Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi (2000) 
found that changes to and from daylight saving time disrupt sleep patterns, and are re-
lated to stock fluctuations. The amount of sunlight in the city of a country‘s major stock 
exchange is associated with higher daily stock index returns in 26 national exchanges in-
cluding the United States (Hirshleifer and Shumway 2001; Saunders 1993). Investors are 
subject to a strong bias toward investing in stocks based in their home country and in 
their local region. In addition, employees invest heavily in their own firm‘s stock and 
perceive it to have low risk (Barker 1997). 
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The crux of the research regarding behavioral aspects of asset pricing theory pre-
sented above provides strong support for Herbert Simon‘s theory of bounded rationality, 
in which limited cognitive power and the complexity of decision problems prevent fully 
rational decisions. Limited attention, memory, and processing capacities force a focus on 
subsets of available information, and the costliness of evaluating contingencies suggests 
that investors may undervalue complex securities, and that imperfect rationality affects 
the introduction and success of new securities. Thus, bounded rationality implies a need 
for simple heuristics for making decisions, suggesting that the use of ―heuristic agents 
may be a fruitful line of inquiry for finance‖ (Hirshleifer 2001, 1563). 
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COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS 
Strategic management‘s ―competitive dynamics‖ is focused on the study of the an-
tecedents and consequences of competitive moves. Building on Schumpeter‘s (1934) 
theory of creative destruction, scholars in this area study how and why firm interactions 
either help or hurt the firms involved in the interactions. They develop theory and empiri-
cal methods centering on conceptualization of a firm‘s strategy as action (Grimm, Lee, 
and Smith 2005). Inquiry in this area is loosely organized into three major categories: 
 Sociological—studies of competitor actions based on focal firm actions 
 Sociological—studies of firm actions based on firm or industry characteristics 
 Economic—studies examining performance based on characteristics of competi-
tive actions 
Researchers in this stream usually make three important assumptions derived from 
D‘Aveni‘s (1994) theory of hypercompetition: competitive advantage is short-lived be-
cause aggressive firm actions disrupt and erode the competitive conduct and perfor-
mance; firms must undertake a series of actions to continuously recreate competitive ad-
vantage; and firms with more competitive actions are generally expected to show superior 
performance. Based on these assumptions, researchers empirically investigated different 
aspects of competitive action, including repertoires, timing, and level of competitive ac-
tion. Early research in this stream focused attention on the sociological aspects of compe-
tition or the action-reaction dyads level of analysis (Chen, Smith, and Grimm 1992). In 
this stream, the characteristics of an individual competitive action, as well as the charac-
teristics of the competing firms, are important predictors of the competitive response. For 
example, Smith, Grimm, Gannon, and Chen (1991) showed that the type of action, stra-
tegic (requiring a significant commitment of resources) versus tactical (an easy-to-
implement, reversible action) affected the response likelihood, response imitation, re-
sponse lag, and response order of competitors in the airline industry (see appendix 1 for a 
complete description of these terms). Chen and Miller (1994) found that action visibility, 
response difficulty, and the potential benefit of an action contributed to the number of 
responses and the response ratio—all competitive responses directed toward the actions 
of a given firm in a given year / the total number of actions made by that firm in that 
year—toward the competitor initiating the original action. 
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The field then moved toward another level of analysis that linked the characteristics 
of actions with performance. This began with an aggregated set of actions over a finite 
time period; that is, the action repertoire-year levels of analysis. Findings suggest that 
broad and complex sets of actions are more likely to have a positive impact on firm per-
formance than narrow and simple repertoires of actions. Miller and Chen (1996) demon-
strated that competitive simplicity, or the range of different action types, impacted the 
revenue per seat mile flown in the airline industry. Similarly, Ferrier, Smith, and Grimm 
(1999) found that action repertoire simplicity, action timing, and leader-challenger action 
dissimilarity impacted market share erosion, or loss of market leadership. 
The field then moved in the direction of examining a firm‘s actions based on the 
characteristics of that firm. Here scholars found that top management team characteristics 
affected strategic change (the diversity across a firm‘s activities) (Wiersema and Bantel 
1992), and that strategic similarity between two firms affected the intensity of rivalry be-
tween firms in the airline industry (Gimeno and Woo 1996). 
Recently, scholars explored the link between the concept of a competitive attack, 
which describes the pattern, order, and pace of an uninterrupted sequence of repeatable 
competitive action events carried out in real time, and performance. This view is consis-
tent with the concept of strategy as a logically unified sequence of actions (Mintzberg and 
Waters 1985), or a simultaneous and sequential set of many actions (D‘Aveni 1994). Re-
latedly, such ―sequences of dynamic competitive moves are an essential component of 
strategic competition‖ (Bettis and Weeks 1987, 449), which has been shown to influence 
performance. For example, Ferrier (2001) found that attack volume, duration, and unpre-
dictability affected market share gain. 
Most recently scholars have begun to explore unanswered questions in the competi-
tive dynamics literature in a series of unpublished working papers. Ferlic, Raisch, and 
Krogh (2008) posited that the combined insights from the competitive action and the 
competitive rivalry research streams indicate that there should be an optimum competi-
tive action level; however, no theory had been developed or empirical research done to 
address this question. These authors reconcile this by identifying upper and lower boun-
daries of competitive action to sustain competitive advantage. Specifically, they demon-
strate that firms whose competitive action is insufficient to defend their competitive posi-
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tion, and whose competitive action exceeds their financial resource limits have poorer 
performance (return to shareholders). Also, Bridoux and Smith (2008) bridge another gap 
by examining which types of actions are most beneficial for firm performance (operating 
profit). They show that actions in product markets, or output actions, have the largest im-
pact on performance. 
This dissertation adds to the latest additions to the stream in two important ways. 
First, as investors are ultimately responsible for fluctuations in stock prices through as-
sessing the value-embedded patterns of competitive behavior, and then buying and then 
acting on these assessments, I examine the mechanism by which investors strive to 
process and assess the multiple channels of information when evaluating a given firm. 
Second, I explore a phenomenon new to both competitive dynamics and the field of strat-
egy as a whole—short-selling. 
Two additional streams of literature, while not defined explicitly as competitive dy-
namics, serve to inform competitive dynamics, thus those streams are briefly discussed 
below. 
Multimarket competition. Multimarket competition is an oligopolistic situation 
where firms compete against each other simultaneously in more than one market (Ed-
wards 1955). Wisely, firms often understand that it may be advantageous to stake out a 
sphere of influence or dominant position in one market, while leaving their competitors‘ 
sphere of influence unchallenged in another area in which they both compete. This allows 
a firm dominant in one market to intimate its subordination in another market, thus acting 
a deterrent to its competitor to initiate a challenge in the market in which the firm is do-
minant. In the realm of multimarket competition, the competitive actions carried out by 
rivals are governed by the threat of retaliation; hence the dynamics of competitive inte-
raction are governed by the respective market shares of firms competing in subsectors of 
an industry. 
Studies of multimarket competition were initiated by the mutual forbearance hypo-
thesis, which posits that firms that have competitive contacts in more than one market 
will compete less intensively with each other—because the threat of retaliation is reci-
procal, the forbearance is mutual. Firms may even completely pull out from their rivals‘ 
markets, in the expectation that their rivals will reciprocate. As long as this were done 
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mutually, firms would have clear economic incentives to trade market share in markets in 
which they do not have large territorial interests for market share in their own important 
markets (Gimeno 1999). 
Previous empirical research in the multimarket stream has attempted to draw rela-
tionships between the amount of multimarket rivalry (generally measured by the number 
of markets in which rivals compete) to the intensity of competition between two firms, 
and has focused mainly on competitive dyads. For example, Baum and Korn (1996) 
found that market domain overlap (aggregate of the markets served by the focal firm and 
each competitor) and multimarket contact (the number of routes on which each competi-
tor meets each other) had an effect on market entry and exit rates in the airline industry. 
In 1999, these same authors found that variables such as the total number of markets an 
airline served at the start of each observation year and the capacity of the markets served 
affected both initiation and expansion of multimarket contact between a focal firm and 
each of its competitors. Gimeno and Woo (1996) examined economic consequences of 
multimarket competition. They found that number of markets in which the airline met a 
specific rival outside the focal market affected not only the intensity of rivalry, but also 
the profitably and efficiency (cost per revenue-passenger-mile) of an airline. According-
ly, multimarket contact not only governs competitive action, but important economic out-
comes. 
Critics of the multimarket competition stream of research have noted that studies 
have found conflicting rates of competition because of multimarket contact. For example, 
Mester (1990) showed that multimarket competition had a positive effect on competition 
in the banking industry, while Baum and Korn (1999) found inverted U-relationships in 
the airline industry. This suggests that either the dynamics of the industry play a role, or 
that other influences or constructs could be responsible for these results. Austrian eco-
nomics‘ concept of ―the perennial gale of creative destruction‖ (Schumpeter 1934) sug-
gests that ―the outcome of market process is the inevitable and eventual market share ero-
sion and dethronement experienced by market share leaders over time through the 
process of competition‖ (Ferrier et al. 1999, 373). Hence, viewing multimarket contact 
through the lens of competitive dynamics within industries could be warranted. 
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Strategic groups. The line of research addressing strategic groups attempts to draw 
meaningful delineations between firms that may compete in the same industry, but do not 
necessarily compete in the same markets. For example, (and relevant to the sample in this 
dissertation) in the pharmaceutical industry, the question of whether generic pharmaceut-
ical companies and ethical pharmaceutical companies are really competing against each 
other would be taken into consideration. 
Considerable variation in defining strategic groups exists, however. Cool and Schen-
del (1987) classified the basic elements of strategic groups according to their business 
scope as follows: 
 the range of market segments targeted 
 the types of products and/or services offered in the market segments selected 
 geographic reach of the product-market strategy 
The theory of strategic groups was developed to test whether one set of strategies was 
more effective than another and to analyze the competitive dynamics within an industry 
(Leask and Parker 2004). For example, Cool and Dierickx (1993) found that the strategic 
distance and the concentration within strategic groups affected profitability. Pegels, Song, 
and Yang (2000) found that membership in different competitive interaction groups af-
fected airline load factors. 
Like multimarket competition, studies of strategic groups have produced mixed 
results. Cool (1985) found that market share differed greatly between groups in U.S. 
pharmaceuticals. However, Martens (1988) failed to find differences in growth of market 
share between groups. This led him to conclude that within-group performance differenc-
es may outweigh between-group differences. Thus, it stands to reason that competitive 
dynamics within groups may be a more fruitful line of inquiry, and a study of how the 
dynamics within groups differs between groups would add to this stream of literature. 
Appendix table. A review table outlining many papers in each of these research 
streams is included in the appendix.  A thorough search of major journals was conducted 
using the following keywords: competitive dynamics, multimarket competitions, mutual 
forbearance, and strategic groups. In addition, the Academy of Management and Strategic 
Management Society conference programs for 2006 were consulted to identify working 
papers in these areas. Each of these authors was contacted via e-mail, and included if the 
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paper was provided, and if it conducted or proposed empirical analysis.  For each paper 
included in the appendix table, I identified the level of analysis and time frame where ap-
plicable, as well as the independent and dependent variables and their associated meas-
ures. 
This literature review and the enclosed table in the appendix serve two purposes. 
The first is to appraise the progress of the field and its contributions. Second, and impor-
tantly, I accounted for the various types of measures of competitive interaction used in 
prior research to assess which measures will best inform STRAPT. Based on the social 
judgment theory outlined below, I believe that the action repertoire, or a series of cues 
over time, is the appropriate level of analysis when studying investor interpretation of 
corporate strategies. In addition, I believe that based on information theory, the measures 
of strategic complexity, heterogeneity, and volume most closely represent the manner in 
which human beings process a series of inputs over time. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Corporations are involved in an unending series of competitive moves and coun-
termoves meant to keep their competitors off balance and their own corporations profita-
ble (e.g., price cutting, introducing new products, marketing campaigns, and capacity ex-
pansions). As each competitive move is announced publicly, anxious outsiders, investors, 
and potential investors evaluate whether the corporation‘s move is likely to succeed or 
fail, which will affect the investors‘ decision to either buy the stock, continue owning the 
stock, sell the stock, or short it. 
The efficient-markets assumption of asset pricing theory posits that investors are 
―rational‖ and value securities based on future earnings discounted by risk. This assumes 
that investors have full knowledge of public information and act rationally (Bromiley and 
James-Wade 2003). However, investor sentiment has presented a challenge to the effi-
cient-markets hypothesis by demonstrating that it is a powerful mechanism by which 
stock prices fluctuate (Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishney 1998). This suggests that scholars 
need to investigate how investors interpret this public information to establish how equi-
ties are truly valued. This requires identification of fundamental (nonfinancial) aspects of 
corporations that are included in investor assessments of a corporation‘s equity shares, 
such as corporate strategies, top management teams, alliances, and incorporation of beha-
vioral analysis of investors, to determine how stock prices will react to an announced se-
ries of competitive moves. Here, fundamental analysis by investors is augmented with the 
systematic scanning for ―market inefficiencies‖ associated with firm-specific investments 
and competitive moves—and additional, but noisy sources of public information. Un-
doubtedly, both classes of investors included in this study—long-buyers and short-
sellers—are ultimately concerned with firm-specific investments, strategies, and tactics 
that are effective versus ineffective, imitable versus inimitable, routine versus deviant. 
Yet, such analysis requires well-developed information-scanning and interpretive 
capabilities that help investors to know where to look, what to look for, and how to as-
cribe meaning to the patterns of events they see. In the absence of the motivation to scan 
for and scrutinize all available information, I propose that some investors apply certain 
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decision-making heuristics that allow them to confidently make a decision about the fu-
ture value-generating capability of a firm‘s chosen strategies. In fact, a recent issue of 
McKinsey Quarterly indicated that some investors do indeed resort to alternative mechan-
isms in evaluating stocks, rather than fastidiously evaluating corporate fundamentals and 
organizational assets that have future value-creating potential (or lack thereof) for the 
corporation‘s equity shares, especially in the short term: 
Market fundamentals explain share price fluctuations over the long term, 
but in the short term investor biases and myopia can skew prices. These 
emotionally driven deviations in the markets can upset a company‘s stra-
tegic plans—if its managers don‘t understand what lies behind the devia-
tions. (McKinsey Quarterly, Fall 2007) 
 
As the above quotation points out, investor perception is a key element in the decisions 
that ultimately drive asset prices; thus, exploration of corporate phenomena outside the 
realm of financial ratios that investors do evaluate is crucial. According to Hirschleifer 
(2001, 1535), ―after decades of study, the sources of risk premia in purely rational dy-
namic models are well understood. In contrast, dynamic psychology-based asset-pricing 
theory is in its infancy.‖ 
To effectively develop a strategic theory of asset pricing, it is important to 
investigate both the long-buyer and the short-seller: if their perceptions differ and 
if and how they come to disparate conclusions about the future value-creating po-
tential of an announced series of strategic moves. I believe the investors of each 
class do come to different conclusions because they use different decision-making 
processes motivated by the risk they must bear and the potential losses they must 
face if they are wrong. Long-buyers, faced with less risk and less to lose, will 
have limited attention and processing capacities. These conditions will prompt 
long-buyers to focus on subsets of available information, and the costliness of 
evaluating complex securities will lead them to use a bounded-rationality ap-
proach, implying a need for heuristics for making decisions (Hirshleifer 2001). 
Short-sellers, faced with much greater risk and unlimited losses, are more likely to 
closely scrutinize corporations‘ strategies, implying a systematic decision-making 
process that may yield different notions of the value of a strategy as it unfolds. In 
fact, short-sellers are heralded as the most informed of investors, and scrutiny of 
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this class of investors will provide managers with additional insight into how in-
vestors perceive the added value of a given series of strategic moves. According 
to Business Week: 
Short-sellers include some of the most talented analysts in the investment 
arena and are noted for their adroit, labor-intensive research. One short-
selling partnership even includes among its analysts a retired physician to 
evaluate biotechnology stocks. But at bottom, what gives shorts an edge is 
sheer shoe leather. 
 
Characteristics and Patterns of Competitive Strategy Perceived as Value Creating 
by Investors. 
Previous scholars have identified research into how important outsiders value 
strategies as a potentially fruitful line of inquiry in competitive dynamics. For example, 
Miller and Chen (1994) averred that ―isomorphic‖ or conventional strategic repertoires 
for companies in the airline industry may be more acceptable to competitors, customers, 
and even suppliers of capital, and lead to superior results in the form of operating revenue 
per available seat mile flown of companies pursuing. The authors asserted that competi-
tive nonconformity will hurt financial performance because it increases costs and com-
petitive risks, and reduces the acceptability of the organizational actions to important out-
siders. 
Thus, to further the line of research proposed by Miller and Chen (1994), the 
question this study explores is what prompts different classes of investors to ―act‖ on a 
series of announcements by actively buying or selling a company‘s stock, which ulti-
mately results in changes in firm valuation. This study contends that stock market re-
sponse to competitive action announcements is based, in part, on the subjective evalua-
tion of the patterns of strategic moves as they unfold. Based on the cognitive model I de-
velop below, I believe that investors evaluate these patterns as to their complexity (how 
different are the moves used in a strategic repertoire), heterogeneity (how different is the 
strategic repertoire from rivals‘), and volume (how many moves do investors see). Ac-
cording to information theory, these are natural codings by the human mind. Key to the 
development of a model of investor decision-making is a complete analysis of the various 
elements of the decision-making process of the two classes of investors I consider with 
regard to strategic repertoires. To begin developing the decision-making framework in 
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the context of strategic actions, I turn to social judgment theory or ―SJT‖ (Brunswick 
1956), and cognitive psychology. These areas elucidate the strategic signals that are rele-
vant to investors, how they process this information, and the mechanisms by which posi-
tive or negative opinions are formed about the patterns of strategic actions they see. 
Investor Psychology and Decision Making 
STEP ONE – Cues - Social Judgment Theory 
The underlying assumption of SJT is that decision-makers (especially long-
buyers) do not have access to ―real‖ information (few companies release negative infor-
mation on themselves), but instead perceive that information through proximal cues. 
Hence SJT captures ―theories in use‖ (those that actually govern decision-makers‘ ac-
tions) as opposed to ―espoused theories of action‖ (those that decision-makers publicly 
state they use) (Hitt and Tyler 1991). In other words, we look at how investors actually 
decide which equities to buy or sell, rather than what they say they do in making their de-
cisions—actual versus reported processes, which can be at odds. 
Within SJT, the lens model is a formal depiction of humans‘ decision-making 
processes (depicted in Figure 5 below). This model links ―cognitive‖ and ―task‖ systems 
by proximal information cues Y e . The cues (represented by the X variables) are the in-
formation factors (the strategic actions companies undertake) that an individual (the in-
vestor) considers when making a decision. The right side of the model represents the 
―cognitive‖ system. Cues are combined in some manner to make a judgment or decision 
(Y s ). Hammond (1975, 73) summarized the lens model: 
 
Judgment is a cognitive process similar to inductive inference, in which 
the person draws a conclusion, or an inference, Y s , about something, Y e , 
which he cannot see (or otherwise directly perceive). In other words, 
judgments are made from palpable events and circumstances. 
 
While this theory was developed in a social realm, it may be broadly applied to all 
kinds of judgments. For example, the lens model can portray an investor deciding wheth-
er to buy or short a stock. The investor appraises the stock‘s potential to go up or down 
based on a number of information factors X k  (i.e., strategic moves, top management 
team characteristics). The investor is not observing the stock‘s ultimate outcome, but in-
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stead is inferring what he thinks that outcome will be based on a number of current ob-
servable conditions, in this case strategic moves (X 1 …. X 4 ). This demonstrates that de-
cision-makers evaluate potential outcomes by using a series of information factors (cues) 
that they can observe, making the evaluation of this potential outcome very subjective. 
Figure 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Once the information cues are observed, strategic asset pricing theory follows a 
long line of arguments of decision-making. Decisions scholars maintain that any signifi-
cant decision is a choice between gambles, because the outcomes of the alternative op-
tions are not fully known in advance. Financial decisions are made in situations of high 
uncertainty that do not allow the decision-maker the luxury of relying on fixed rules 
(Hirshleifer 2001). Thus, decision-makers are compelled to rely on alternative mechan-
isms such as intuition, which is motivated by their subjective interpretation of the pattern 
of events as they unfold. 
STEP TWO – Coding – Information Theory 
Classification of event sequences. When evaluating the human percep-
tion/judgment element of strategies carried out in a given time frame, it is essential to ca-
tegorize these strategies along dimensions revealed in the psychology literature as natural 
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constituents of human cognition. Previous studies that have looked at sequences of events 
have classified the sequences as complex, heterogeneous, and so forth, in a rather ad-hoc 
fashion. These scholars have assumed that important outsiders see the world in these se-
quences, without justifying why outsiders will interpret patterns as scholars have as-
sumed. Thus, the next step in strategic asset pricing theory is to explore how investors ca-
tegorize the many cues that companies deliver. Information theory (Simon 1972) gleans 
insight into these phenomena by revealing that humans do indeed categorize cues into 
patterns, and by introducing the various inherent categorization tendencies of the human 
mind. 
Information theory supports this notion by introducing representational (or ―in-
formation-processing‖) explanations of this type of coding, known as ―serial pattern 
processing,‖ and postulates one or more processes for inducing pattern description from 
sequences. According to Simon (1972) people appear to have strong propensities, wheth-
er learned or innate, to discover patterns in temporal sequences presented by the envi-
ronment, and to use these patterns to predict positive or negative future outcomes—they 
know what they see and whether they like or dislike what they see. 
Information theory postulates that one direct method to measure information se-
quences is by their complexity, which is the amount of information, the breadth of the in-
formation, and the variability of the elements within the sequence of information. Thus, 
when looking at various types of strategies one can logically assume that investors are 
classifying the sequences in a similar fashion. This assumption gives rise to strategic 
classifications such as complexity and heterogeneity (the breadth of information—how 
different a focal firm‘s strategy is from its previous strategies and those of its competi-
tors) and volume (the amount of information). 
Thus, while I have not had to change the measures based on cognitive principles, 
an important part of strategic asset pricing theory is understanding how investors will ap-
ply these cognitive principles to comprehend and react to the patterns of strategic action 
sequences they observe. Further, I believe that these are the elements of a competitive 
strategy that investors will find salient (Fiske and Taylor 1991). In hypothesis develop-
ment, based on cognitive principles, I will go further to justify how different classes of 
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investors make decisions about the ―wholes‖ they observe and whether they will like or 
dislike the various patterns of events as they unfold. 
STEP THREE – The Salience of Cues 
Investors are generally bombarded with news events regarding the stocks they 
own, have sold short, or are considering trading. The Dow Jones newswire can publish 
thousands of press releases and corporate announcements each day. To which announce-
ments do investors attend and react? The cognitive literature on salience of proximal cues 
provides some suggestions, which I apply to this setting. 
Fiske and Taylor (1991) have identified several aspects of peoples‘ behaviors that 
onlookers view as salient. These scholars assert that salient properties such as novelty 
(dissimilar to the individual‘s previous behaviors) are attention-getting. In addition, on-
lookers will find behavior unusual for a social category (i.e., heterogeneous) to be salient. 
Third, Fiske and Taylor (1991) averred that observers find persons or objects that domi-
nate the visual field to be salient. 
I argue that an investor‘s evaluation of a corporation‘s strategic moves requires 
that the investor first take note of the moves. For example, Apple recently reduced the 
price of iPhones by $200, departing from their customary strategy of waiting several 
months to cut prices, as they did with several versions of the iPod. This departure from 
the norm garnered significant attention and even outraged early adopters. Investors rep-
lied in kind with a 2% reduction of Apple‘s stock price in a single day. Thus, I believe 
that the same characteristics that make generic cues salient (as described above) also 
make the strategies of corporations salient to market investors. Thus, investors take note 
when corporations undertake strategic patterns that are distinctive from their referent ri-
vals and previous strategies, and are dominating—consisting of a large number of com-
petitive moves that dominate the cognitive space. 
STEP FOUR - The Decision-making Process—Heuristic vs. Systematic 
Human decision-making processes can be placed into three general categories: 
simplistic, heuristic, and systematic. Simplistic decision-making occurs without regard to 
rational calculation. For example, decisions may be formed ―on the doorstep‖ (Converse 
1964; Zaller 1992) or in response to arbitrary stimuli such as symbols (Kinder and Sand-
ers 1996). An investor using the simplistic decision-making process may, for example, 
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buy Starbucks stock on impulse because he likes the green color of its store logo. I pro-
pose very few investors use such a simple decision-making process because an element 
of risk is always involved. 
The second type of decision-making, heuristic decision-making involves consi-
derable rational thought but limited systematic effort (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). 
Heuristics refer to the choice of something that comes easily or intuitively to mind, but 
the term also refers to more deliberate strategies that people use to limit or guide their 
search among options (Kahneman 2002; Kahneman and Frederick 2002). Important to 
note is that the cues discussed by social judgment theory play a significant role in both 
simplistic and heuristic decision-making processes—irrationally in the former, rationally 
in the latter. For example, when using a simplistic style, cues such as competitive moves 
may not be evaluated as to their value-creating capability; the investor may just like the 
latest Budweiser Clydesdale ad and buy the stock. Those using a more heuristic process 
will, at least to some extent, assess the value-creating potential of these competitive 
moves. 
Basing judgment on data that is processed according to heuristic choice rules re-
duces effort and is generally quite useful, but can sometimes lead to biases or systematic 
judgment errors (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Indeed, scholars have debated at length 
whether the tendency toward ―cognitive stinginess‖ reflects ignorant incompetence or ra-
tional efficiency (Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Petty and Cacioppo 1986). Many studies have 
shown that ―gut level‖ heuristic processing often produces outcomes that are very similar 
to those produced under conditions of complete analysis of information (Downs 1957; 
Lupia 1994; Nisbett and Ross 1980). However, as Tversky and Kahneman (1974) ob-
served, heuristics introduce bias into the decision-making environment almost by defini-
tion. And indeed, although reliance on heuristics may be perfectly rational, several stu-
dies have now demonstrated that heuristic-based decisions do not necessarily lead to 
―correct‖ decisions (Bartels 1996; Lau and Redlawsk 1997). Biases resulting from the use 
of heuristics include: 
 Representativeness: The tendency to make decisions based on stereotypes or to 
see patterns where none exist. It can, for example, influence our preference not to 
fly after a well-publicized plane crash. In financial markets, representativeness 
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manifests when investors seek ―hot‖ stocks and avoid stocks that have performed 
poorly in the recent past. 
 Overconfidence: The tendency for people to be highly overconfident about their 
abilities and knowledge. For example, evidence shows that Wall Street analysts 
are slow to revise their previous assessment of a company‘s likely future perfor-
mance, even when notable evidence shows that their existing assessment is incor-
rect (Kumar 2005). Overconfidence has often been suggested as one reason ana-
lysts touted Enron stock even after evidence of accounting irregularities became 
apparent. 
 Anchoring: The inclination for investors to use recent observations to determine 
what is fair. For example a used-car salesman always starts negotiating with a 
high price and then works down. The salesman is trying to get the consumer 
―anchored‖ on the high price so that when he offers a lower price, the consumer 
sees value. Anchoring leads investors to expect a stock to continue to trade in a 
defined range or to expect a company‘s earnings to be in line with historical 
trends, leading to possible under-reaction to changes in trends (Kumar 2005). 
 Gambler’s Fallacy: The tendency for people to predict inappropriately that a 
trend will reverse, a belief in regression to the mean. Gambler‘s fallacy may lead 
investors to anticipate the end of a run of good (or poor) market returns and to sell 
winners quickly (Kumar 2005). 
 Fluency Heuristic: The tendency for individuals to infer that an object has higher 
value with respect to another that is being considered (Jacoby and Brooks 1984). 
If one object is processed faster or more fluently than another, that is, if individu-
als must strive to ―figure something out,‖ they may place a lower value on the cri-
terion. The fluency heuristic can explain investors‘ tendencies to invest in stocks 
that are easier to value. 
 Affect Heuristic: The tendency for humans‘ affect to influence their decision-
making, meaning a strong emotional response to a stimulus might alter their 
judgment. Finucane (2000) used the affect heuristic to explain the unexpected 
negative correlation between benefit and risk perception by demonstrating that a 
good feeling toward a situation (i.e., positive affect) would lead to a lower risk 
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perception and a higher benefit perception, even when this perception is logically 
not warranted. 
 Recognition Heuristic: The tendency for people to infer that one object has higher 
value than another because the valued object is recognized and the other is not 
(Goldstein and Gigerenzer 1999). In the stock market, participants have a greater 
perceived familiarity with local and domestic securities and, in turn, invest more 
in such securities (Ackert, Church, Tompkins, and Zhang 2005). 
 Exposure Heuristic: The tendency, which psychologists have long observed, that 
repeated, unreinforced exposure increases positive affect toward a stimulus 
(Fechner 1876; Maslow 1937). A number of early studies of exposure heuristics 
investigated the effects of repeated exposures on affective ratings of music and 
generally found more positive ratings with increasing familiarity (e.g., Meyer 
1903; Moore and Gilliland 1924; Washburn, Child, and Abel 1927). Investors 
tend to have positive affect toward stocks to which they have significant expo-
sure, often achieved through advertising. 
The third process of decision-making, systematic decision-making, by contrast, in-
volves effortful, methodical, and even scientific processing of relevant criteria. Motiva-
tion to process systematically is often determined by the evaluator‘s desire for accuracy 
in judgments. To the extent that an evaluator has a strong desire to reach an accurate con-
clusion, that individual is more likely to engage in systematic processing (Chaiken, Gin-
er-Sorolla, and Chen 1996) when they are motivated and able to ―cognitively elaborate‖ 
on the decision at hand (Chaiken 1980). Senge (1990) provided a powerful example for 
why systematic decision-making rather than ―intuition‖ often leads to better outcomes. 
This author envisioned a swimmer caught in a whirlpool‘s vortex: while swimmers would 
instinctively fight against being sucked down, their only chance of survival would be to 
allow themselves to go down and then swim laterally to escape drowning. Only a system-
ic view of the situation allows the swimmer to escape (Senge 1990). 
As evidenced by Malhotra (2006), relationships and interactions among and between 
decisions may affect the quality of decision results, and a systematic decision process is 
necessary to do this. In one study, he showed that for one product line, a second-tier sup-
plier to a large firm had a high cost structure and passed these costs to the customer. Ne-
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gotiations yielded no real solution. A more systematic analysis exposed the real problem. 
A third supplier was supplying the second-tier supplier and was charging high prices. By 
negotiating with the third-tier firm, the cost structure of the second-tier supplier was re-
duced to the extent that it could supply the same input material at a much lower price 
than before. These improvements would not have come about without looking at the en-
tire set of supply chain entities in a more systematic fashion (Malhotra 2006). From an 
investment standpoint, investors that have a higher likelihood of ―drowning‖ will be more 
compelled to use such systematic processes. 
HYPOTHESES 
Within strategic management, the competitive dynamics stream of research has 
examined the game theoretic stability of costly signaling by developing theory and empir-
ical methods centering on conceptualization of firm strategy as competitive action (Smith, 
Ferrier, and Ndofor 2001). In general, early research in this stream focused attention on 
the action-reaction dyads level of analysis (e.g., Chen et al. 1992), whereby the characte-
ristics of an individual competitive action, as well as the characteristics of the competing 
firms, are important predictors of the intensity of an individual competitive response. 
This analysis has taken on the form of development of effective responses in the face of 
actions a competitor initiates (Smith et al. 1991; Bettis and Hitt 1995; Chen and Ham-
brick 1995), and has also demonstrated a link between the characteristics of an aggre-
gated set of actions over a finite time period and performance; that is, the action reper-
toire-year levels of analysis (e.g., Ferrier et al. 1999; Miller and Chen 1996). 
Most recently, scholars have introduced the concept of a competitive attack, 
which describes the pattern, order, and pace of an uninterrupted sequence of repeatable 
competitive action events carried out in real time (Abbott 1990; Ferrier 2001; Ferrier and 
Lee 2002). This view is consistent with the concept of strategy as a logically unified se-
quence of actions (Kirzner 1973), patterns or consistencies in streams of behaviors 
(Mintzberg and Waters 1985), or a coordinated series of actions (MacCrimmon 1993). 
Relatedly, such ―sequences of dynamic competitive moves are an essential component of 
strategic competition‖ (Bettis and Weeks 1987, 449), which has a demonstrable influence 
on competing firms‘ stock prices. Accordingly, investors are ultimately responsible for 
fluctuations in stock prices through assessing the value embedded in the real-time pat-
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terns of competitive behavior, and then buying or selling these equity shares based on 
these evaluations. Thus, the next step in strategic asset pricing theory is to examine the 
under-explored mechanism by which investors strive to process and assess the multiple 
channels of information when evaluating a given firm. Based on the cognitive principles 
outlined above, I believe that these investors evaluate strategic actions based on their 
complexity, heterogeneity, and volume. Furthermore, I believe that investors have a 
short- term time frame, as compensation schemes on Wall Street often alter fund objec-
tives from a long-term to a short-term perspective (Brown and Starks 1997). Thus, I test 
my model at the action repertoire-month level of analysis, confining observations of 
strategy to a moving window of ―strategic time‖ in which adaptive strategic decisions are 
made (Ramaprasad and Stone 1992). 
Strategic complexity – breadth of range of within-firm strategic repertoires. One 
of the most fundamental ideas of competitive interaction posits that firms should execute 
strategy in an effort to dampen the ability or motivation of competitors to respond (Smith 
et al. 2001; Ferrier 2001). Prior research has found that rivals will easily understand and 
unravel very simple competitive strategies or strategies that are similar to those of rivals, 
thereby leaving the attacking firm vulnerable to aggressive competitive response. Con-
versely, very complex competitive strategies require the mobilization of sizable resources 
and managerial effort to carry out, thus increasing the cost and reducing the speed of im-
plementation, which can also have negative consequences for performance. Thus, an in-
verted U-shaped relationship is implied. But how do investors evaluate this complexity? 
Psychology scholars have demonstrated that if a person can process one out of 
two items more fluently or more rapidly, the person will infer that easily processed object 
has the higher value (Jacoby and Brooks 1984). Termed the fluency heuristic, researchers 
have shown that people might use a cue‘s fluency, or the ease with which it is processed, 
as an additional basis for weighting the value of cues. For example, Shah and Oppenhei-
mer (2007) showed that when participants were given the names of two different broker-
age firms, one easy and the other difficult to pronounce, participants assigned greater 
value to the stock of the firm that had the easily pronounceable name and lesser value to 
the stock of the firm that had a name with complex pronunciation. This highlights a rather 
simple tendency: people place greater weight on information that feels easy to process. 
 
 37  
Previous scholars investigating the complexity of messages have also shown that 
if subjects found the message complexity to be too great, the message not only resulted in 
―nonlearning‖; in fact it induced negative feelings (Eagly 1974; Chaiken and Eagly 1976, 
1983). To the contrary, Berlyne (1972) found that subjects showed an affinity for com-
plex messages. Accordingly, very complex competitive strategies convey a diverse spec-
trum of information that investors may either find difficult to absorb and use efficiently, 
or they may like what they see. 
I believe that when long-buyers and short-sellers evaluate strategic complexity 
they will react differently; one group will deem these strategies to be superior; the other 
group, fettered by their motivation and ability to exhaustively scrutinize complex strate-
gies, will react negatively to too much complexity. The complexity will be attractive to 
both groups at first (moving from zone 1 to zone 2 in Figure 6), as these companies will 
seemingly be carrying out strategies that competitors will find difficult to counter. How-
ever as the complexity increases to the point where the company is moving into zone 3, 
the long-buyer, lacking the motivation to unravel all of the elements of this complex 
strategy, will resort to the fluency heuristic and experience increasing difficulty in seeing 
the value in the complexity. In fact, I believe that these strategies may evoke feelings of 
unpleasantness, even discomfort, as the complexity increases beyond that which the in-
vestor wishes to assimilate (Eagly 1974; Chaiken and Eagly 1976, 1983). Thus, the affect 
heuristic will lead the investor to develop a negative attitude toward the equity share of 
the company in question. This attitude will prompt the long-buyer to sell the stock, thus 
lowering stock prices. 
Hypothesis 1: The complexity of a firm’s strategic repertoire will exhibit an 
inverted U-shaped relationship with stock returns (Figure 6). 
On the other hand, I believe the short-seller, faced with costs and risks that far ex-
ceed the long-buyer‘s costs and risks when transacting stock, will strive to unravel the 
elements of a strategy as complexity increases in an effort to determine whether the com-
plexity will add value to the equity shares. Like the long-buyer, the short-seller will likely 
believe that competitors will easily decipher strategies that are too simplistic and put the 
company at risk, which leads to higher levels of short interest. As complexity increases to 
a given level, short-sellers, like long-buyers, will applaud the advantages of being less 
vulnerable to rivals. However, as complexity increases to the level where the long-buyer 
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becomes apprehensive, the short-seller‘s systematic decision-making approach will not 
incite the belief that high levels of internal complexity are necessarily detrimental. In 
fact, while higher levels of costs and risk may be associated with such complexity, the 
short-seller will realize that the complexity has associated benefits in the form of keeping 
rivals off guard and will refrain from shorting the stock. Thus, the greater the complexity 
of a firm‘s strategic repertoire, the lower the level of short interest in the company. 
Figure 6 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 2: The complexity of a firm’s strategic repertoire will exhibit a 
negative relationship with short interest (Figure 7). 
 
Strategic heterogeneity – differences in between-firm strategic repertoires. The 
strategy literature seems to disagree over the implications of competitive nonconformity, 
or strategic heterogeneity. Porter (1980, 1985) has advocated the merits of atypical 
(hence heterogeneous) competitive repertoires that confuse rivals and are hard for com-
petitors to detect and counter (Chen and MacMillan 1992; Chen and Miller 1994). In ad-
dition, effective competition from the Austrian perspective espouses strategic and re-
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source heterogeneity (Jacobsen 1992). This perspective advocates creation of competitive 
advantage through possession of the knowledge, resources, and flexibility to engage in a 
variety of actions, and that successful firms are able to combine and direct these re-
sources differently than other firms. Thus, much of the basis for value creation is attri-
buted to the ability of firms to innovate or compete in a manner unique to their competi-
tors. 
Figure 7 
 
 
However, Miller and Chen (1996) pointed out that distinctive products and 
processes may actually be troublesome to important outsiders; hence the costs of noncon-
formity may overshadow its advantages. They found that revenue per seat mile declined 
for airlines that strayed too far from the strategies of their competitors. Deephouse (1996) 
found that strategic isomorphism was positively associated with both regulatory and pub-
lic endorsements, however in a later study, he found an inverted U-shaped relationship 
with return on assets as the performance measure. Institutional theorists have also argued 
for the advantages of conformity in many organizational contexts. They believe that 
companies stand to benefit by following typical repertoires, as customers, competitors, 
and powerful stakeholders perceive these repertoires to be legitimizing (Meyer and Ro-
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wan 1977; Scott and Meyer 1983). Thus, complacent firms may not actually diminish 
their performance when they are inactive or unwilling to continually innovate or compete 
aggressively. 
I believe that when competing firms differ greatly in the composition, pattern, and 
pacing of the competitive attacks each carries out against the other, long-buyers, in ac-
cordance with Miller and Chen (1996) and Deephouse (1996), will not ascribe value to 
the departure from the status quo. Long-buyers will, in fact, be influenced by the recogni-
tion heuristic; they will consider those firms that conform to the strategies that are recog-
nized, those their competitors carry out, to be more legitimate and of higher value. 
Bornstein (1989) suggested that a preference for something that is recognized or familiar 
is a logical human process, as unfamiliar stimuli and situations are potentially riskier than 
familiar ones, and the familiarity is preferred even in negative situations. 
In their discussion of the recognition heuristic, Anderson and Rakow (2007) 
provided several instances in which people use this heuristic—examples that are use-
ful for discussion. Many people likely believe that consumer products, movies, and 
sports teams that they have heard of are more successful than those whose names or 
titles are unfamiliar. In fact, some recent negative publicity for a Disney Channel star 
was touted as a positive for her career because it increased her name recognition; 
some suggested that this individual posted the negative information herself, knowing 
it would bring a myriad of endorsements and other contracts. This heuristic has also 
been prevalent in empirical studies of stock selection. Scholars have demonstrated 
that private investors tend to purchase ―high-profile‖ stocks that have previously ex-
perienced high volumes or returns, or have been publicized in recent press releases 
and news reports. This investment strategy, however, has been shown to underper-
form the market index (Barber and Odean 2005). Weber, Siebenmorgen, and Weber 
(2005) provided some insight into why investors might follow an unprofitable in-
vestment strategy driven by the ―attention-grabbing‖ features of shares. They found 
that people tend to perceive that shares of companies whose names they recognize 
are less risky than those with which they are unfamiliar. It ensues that some firms 
within an industry become known for strategies that are recognized and acceptable in 
that industry, and that some investors will penalize firms that deviate from the estab-
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lished, particularly long-buyers who are more likely to resort to heuristics. Thus, the 
greater the heterogeneity of a firm‘s strategic repertoire, the lower the stock returns. 
Hypothesis 3: The heterogeneity of a firm’s strategic repertoire will exhibit a 
negative relationship with stock returns (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8 
 
 
I believe that short-sellers, who follow the more systematic of decision-making 
processes, will not resort to simply recognizing the patterns of cues to ascribe value to 
these strategies. In fact, at first they will find the novelty to be value-enhancing in a Por-
teresque fashion—the nonconformity will be perceived as a competitive advantage result-
ing in lower short interest. However, as the firms depart from strategies that have proven 
successful within their industries and develop repertoires that are too different from their 
referent rival, then short-sellers, faced with high levels of risk, will cease shorting these 
stocks. Unable to compare the firm‘s strategies with the strategies of others in the indus-
try, the short-seller will find it difficult to achieve the high level of analysis required to 
effectively evaluate strategies and determine whether they will create value. In other 
words, the short-seller will not have enough information to suit the systematic decision-
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making process, and this will lead the short-seller to avoid the equity shares. Thus, the in-
creased heterogeneity of a firm‘s strategic repertoire will exhibit a nonlinear relationship 
with short interest.  
Hypothesis 4: The heterogeneity of a firm’s strategic repertoire will exhibit a 
nonlinear relationship with short interest (Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9 
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Strategic volume.  An important principle of competitive rivalry posits that when 
firms are able to initiate and sustain competitive attacks on rivals these actions will keep 
rivals off balance and on the defensive (D‘Aveni 1994; Ferrier 2001). So, when carrying 
out corporate strategies, more may be better. Indeed, strategic volume has been related to 
firm performance. Young, Smith, and Grimm (1996) found that when firms increase their 
competitive moves, they experience higher returns on assets and sales; that is, firms win 
when they consistently carry out more competitive actions than their rivals do. Several 
studies have also both proposed and shown volume of competitive moves to be beneficial 
when defending market share. Huff and Robinson (1994) contended that firms improve 
their competitive position when they undertake competitive actions to steal market share 
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from the market leader. Likewise, market leaders are expected to lose their position un-
less they act competitively to prevent competitors from eroding their market share (Ket-
chen, Snow, and Street 2004). Ferrier et al. (1999), in a study of 41 industry leaders and 
challengers, found that market leaders are more likely to lose market share if they initiate 
fewer moves than their challengers do. 
The more strategic moves carried out, however, the higher the cost and risk that a 
rival firm can unravel a pattern, anticipate the next move, and respond to the elements of 
the strategy. For example, empirical studies have shown that firms generally improve 
their relative competitive position through price-cuts or excessive expenditures, which 
depletes financial resources (Armstrong and Collopy 1996). Moreover, intense industry 
rivalry is related to surging costs of scarce resource procurement, and could spur suppli-
ers to extend distribution to rivals (Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993). Scholars have also con-
tended that competitor responses not only counteract a competitive action‘s benefits, but 
they may also induce a need for further actions. Consequently, costs may rise faster than 
revenues (Porter 1980, 1985; Shamsie 1990). This implies that the cost associated with 
executing a large number of strategic actions may outweigh the benefit. What do inves-
tors think? 
Psychologists have long observed that repeated, unreinforced exposure to a stimu-
lus increases positive affect toward the stimulus (Fechner 1876; Maslow 1937). A num-
ber of early studies in this exposure heuristic showed that repeated exposures and increas-
ing familiarity generally elicited more positive ratings of music (Meyer 1903; Moore and 
Gilliland 1924). Additional evidence for the hypothesis that increased exposure leads to 
more positive affect toward a stimulus came from studies of social interaction (Festinger 
1951; Newcomb 1963). More recently, this heuristic generated “overnight fame,” in 
which exposure caused nonfamous names to be judged as famous (Jacoby, Kelley, 
Brown, and Jasechko 1989). 
Recent research in the finance literature has suggested that exposure to a company 
can benefit the corporation‘s equity shares. Scholars have provided empirical evidence 
that a firm‘s overall visibility with investors, as measured by its product market advertis-
ing, has important consequences for the equity shares. Specifically, researchers have 
demonstrated that firms with greater advertising expenditures have a larger number of 
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both individual and institutional investors (Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston 2004). Thus, I 
believe that a firm carrying out a large volume of strategic moves will benefit by the 
long-buyer‘s use of the exposure heuristic. Absent the motivation to hunt for negative in-
formation, the long-buyer will take notice of the firm‘s equities and buy in a linear fa-
shion to the number of strategic moves carried out. 
 Short-sellers will likely evaluate strategic volume differently. I believe that in 
zone 1 of the curve, like the long-buyer, the short-seller will believe that the company 
must implement some strategic moves to defend and improve their competitive position 
in the marketplace. Thus, in zone 1, the short-seller will short the stock because he be-
lieves the company‘s inactivity will cause erosion of competitive position. As the compa-
ny implements more strategic moves, the short-seller will see value in the increased quan-
tity, but only to an extent. As the corporation carries out more and more strategic moves, 
the short-seller will see these moves as beneficial in defending market share and competi-
tive position down to the level depicted by zone 2. After this point, the short-seller, faced 
with greater cost and risk, will systematically evaluate the high volume strategy and note 
the decreasing marginal benefit of numerous competitive actions. This systematic deci-
sion-making process will allow the short-seller to realize, as espoused by Porter (1985), 
that there is an associated cost to implementing these strategic moves, and in fact, costs 
may rise faster than revenues. This will lead to increased short-selling as depicted by 
zone 3. 
Hypothesis 5: The larger the volume of a firm’s strategic repertoire, the 
higher its stock returns (Figure 10). 
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Figure 10 
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Hypothesis 6: The volume of a firm’s strategic repertoire will exhibit a U-
shaped relationship with short interest (Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11 
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 CHAPTER 4  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Sample. I focused on a sample of firms that list pharmaceutical preparation as 
their primary business (SIC code 2834), a designation taken from the COMPUSTAT da-
tabase. The pharmaceutical industry has clearly identifiable boundaries, which ensures 
that competitive moves carried out among industry participants are clearly directed at im-
proving a company‘s position in the industry relative to other industry players. Also, as 
the valuations of many firms in the industry rely heavily on future cash flows, this en-
sures that firms widely advertise competitive moves that will enhance the value-
generating ability of the firm, and that investors, at least in part, are likely to use judg-
ments about competitive strategy as the basis for value creation, rather than operating ra-
tios, which in many cases do not exist. Also, because R&D expenditures by these firms 
are substantial, and products generated by these R&D expenditures have blockbuster po-
tential, competitive interaction is intense.  
Four criteria were used to identify a sample of firms from this industry. First, 
firms that designated the SIC code 2834 (pharmaceutical preparation industry) as their 
primary business were selected from the COMPUSTAT database. This set of firms fo-
cused on pharmaceutical product development as their major business. As a result, I ex-
cluded those firms that were involved only in marketing and distribution activities in the 
pharmaceutical section. Second, to create a balanced panel of data, I selected only those 
leading firms that reported their research and development investments every year from 
1998-2004. This sampling process yielded a final research sample consisting of a pooled, 
7-year cross-sectional database (1998–2004) for the 100 publicly traded firms within the 
pharmaceutical industry. The N overall was 8568, or 12 months × 7 years × 102 compa-
nies. 
Strategy as action. A key tenet of competitive dynamics and hypercompetition 
theory posits that competitive advantage must be achieved by aggressively and cleverly 
outmaneuvering rivals in the marketplace with a series of competitive actions (D‘Aveni 
1994). Prior research in competitive dynamics defines competitive actions as externally 
directed, specific, and observable competitive moves initiated by a firm to enhance its 
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relative competitive position (see Ferrier 2001; Smith et al. 2001). Keeping consistent 
with this prior research, I used structured content analysis to code these competitive ac-
tions (Jauch, Osborn, and Martin 1980), a method that allows for reducing a text to a 
unit-by-variable matrix and enables researchers to quantitatively test hypotheses (Denzin 
and Lincoln 2000). Using Factiva, an electronic online database, I searched for published 
articles of news announcements of competitive actions for all companies in the 2834 SIC 
code that were publicly traded from 1998–2004. Because of its global scope (news 
sourced from Reuters, Dow Jones, and many others), my use of Factiva as a news source 
ensured that all relevant announcements were included in the database, and thus, captured 
in my analyses. In addition, compared with other sources used in previous research (e.g., 
F&S Predicast), Factiva provides full articles in electronic form, rather than news head-
lines alone. This enhanced my ability to reliably categorize news about a given compa-
ny‘s competitive actions into different action types. 
This search was based on keywords developed to retrieve announcements that 
were categorized by action types that were relevant to the pharmaceutical industry. I used 
the action categories developed in previous competitive-dynamics research (Ferrier 2001; 
Ferrier et al. 1999), and adjusted these categories to the specific characteristics of the 
pharmaceutical industry. This was accomplished through careful screening of numerous 
news announcements of several companies to determine the types of externally directed 
moves that comprised ―strategy‖ in the pharmaceutical industry. For example while de-
fending patents may be irrelevant in an industry such as womens, misses, and juniors out-
erwear (SIC Code 2330), it is critical in the pharmaceutical industry where, when a drug 
goes off patent, generic drugs are free to compete with it and sales typically decline 75% 
(Arnott 2001). Thus, premature introduction of a generic, or a formula similar enough to 
violate a patent, can cost a drug company hundreds of millions of dollars in revenues, and 
patents are vigorously defended. This assisted in establishing an initial categorization of 
each news item into one of following action type categories: 
1. price (e.g., announcement of price changes or sales incentives), 
2. marketing (e.g., announcement of new advertising or promotional cam-
paign), 
3. new product introduction (e.g., introduction of new product), 
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4. capacity (e.g., new manufacturing plants), 
5. legal (e.g., attempts to block a competitor‘s introduction of a competing 
product), 
6. overt signals (e.g., announcements of future actions that may or may 
not be realized) 
7. improvement actions (e.g., improvements to existing products), 
8. promotion actions (e.g., attempts to promote products or the image of 
the company), 
9. clinical trials (e.g., announcements of movement into new phases of 
clinical trials), and 
10. licensing actions (e.g., acquiring products through licensing from oth-
ers). 
Table 1 provides a complete list of these action categories, as well as examples of the 
keywords used to generate each news announcement, and samples of news announce-
ments. 
 
 50  
Table 1 
Action Types, Coding Keywords, and Example Headlines 
ACTION 
TYPE 
CONTENT ANALYSIS 
CODING SCHEME 
 EXAMPLES OF HEADLINES 
Pricing Ac-
tions 
 
Keywords: price, cut, discount, 
change 
 ―Abbott Laboratories has lowered pric-
es on about 50 of its drugs (mostly in-
jectable anesthetics and intravenous 
products).‖ 
Marketing 
Actions 
Keywords: advertise, commercial, 
television, campaign, spot 
 ―Interneuron Pharmaceuticals an-
nounces alliance with American Cya-
namid to market anti-obesity product‖ 
Product Ac-
tions 
Keywords: introduce, launch, un-
veil, roll out, approve 
 
 ―Merck introduces Mevacor, to reduce 
serum cholesterol‖ 
Capacity Ac-
tions 
Keywords: raises, boosts, increase, 
expand 
 ―Alpharma Reaches Agreement to Ex-
pand Vancomycin Capacity‖ 
 
Legal 
Actions 
Keywords: sue, litigate, settle, in-
fringement 
 
 ―Allergan Sues Santen Pharmaceutical, 
Alleges Rights Infringement‖ 
Signaling Ac-
tions 
 
Keywords: vows, promises, says, 
seeks, aims 
 ―Elan restructuring aims to please mar-
ket.‖ 
Improvement 
Actions 
 
Keywords: improve, enhance, up-
date, change 
 ―Systematic Tooling Analysis Im-
proves Warner-Lambert Product 
Transfer‖ 
Promotion 
Actions 
 
Keywords: donate, contest, 
sponsor, promote 
 ―Eli Lilly To Donate Drugs To Battle 
Tuberculosis Crisis In Russia‖ 
Clinical Trial 
Actions 
 
Keywords: phase, clinical, trial  ―Bristol-Myers, Liposome Begin Phase 
II Testing Of ABLC Drug‖ 
Licensing Ac-
tions 
 
Keywords: license, contract   ―Mylan licenses controlled release 
product from Andrx‖ 
Using Perrault and Leigh‘s (1989) index of reliability, an index of 89% was attained for 
these action types. 
 
After indentifying the action categories, I scanned several headlines in each cate-
gory to determine which ―keywords‖ were most often included in the headline and first 
few sentences of the article text, and I developed and applied a detailed keyword screen-
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ing schema. After cleaning the data from repeating or irrelevant news, I transferred the 
full articles (and citations) into a Microsoft Access database. Overall, my study included 
6,258 competitive actions from 100 companies over this time frame. I read and indepen-
dently recoded each of these 6,258 news articles into the 10 action categories described 
above. To test for reliability of the coding, I randomly selected 50 articles, which were 
independently recoded by two outside raters. I used Perrault and Leigh‘s (1989) proce-
dure to estimate the reliability of my coding the news items into the different action cate-
gories. I achieved a reliability index of 89%, which exceeds the convention of 0.70 (Den-
zin and Lincoln 2000). 
Dependent Variables 
Cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARS). I used the event-study methodology 
approach recommended by McWilliams and Siegel (1997) to test the abnormal stock 
price returns of the firms related to the sequential patterns of competitive actions. The 
event-study method was developed to measure the effect of an unanticipated event on 
stock prices. The standard approach estimates a market model for each firm and then cal-
culates abnormal returns relative to some index, in this case, the S&P 500. The method is 
as follows: The rate of return on the share price of firm i on day t is expressed as: 
R it = i  +  i  + R mt  +  it  
R it  = the rate of return on the share price of firm i on day t, 
R mt  = the rate of return on the Standard & Poor‘s 500 day t, 
  = the intercept term, 
  = the systematic risk of stock i, 
and 
 it = the error term, with E(cit) = 0. 
 
Abnormal returns capture the financial impact of unanticipated and new informa-
tion associated with the action sequences, and account for the market‘s assessments of the 
firm‘s ability to create value through a set of announced strategic actions. The cumulative 
abnormal returns that correspond to each action in the sequence of competitive actions 
carried out in a given month were summed at the monthly level. I included the returns 
within a one-day window around the day each strategic move was announced rather than 
average monthly returns. The one-day window captures the possible ―leakage‖ prior to 
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the publication of the news headline or slow reactions by some investors to a particular 
strategic action or tactic; however, this relatively short window excludes confounding 
events. This short event window implies that I follow the assumption of market efficien-
cy; that is to say that I believe that any financially relevant information that is newly re-
vealed to investors will be quickly incorporated into stock prices (not necessarily in the 
same manner), however the two day window does allow for leakage and slower reactions 
by some investors which does occur. For example, on November 20, 2000, the Wall 
Street Journal reported that Coca-Cola was in talks to acquire Quaker Oats. Shortly the-
reafter, Coca-Cola confirmed such discussions. The market reacted negatively, sending 
Coke‘s shares down almost 8% on November 20th, and more than 2% on November 21
st
, 
the next day.   
Short Interest. Short interest is the proportion of the number of shares sold short 
to the total shares outstanding. Short interest figures are generally collected in the middle 
of the month, and published two days later in the Wall Street Journal. For calculation 
simplicity, each month the shorted interest portfolios were created on the last day of the 
month based on the current short interest information as reported on the NASDAQ and 
NYSE stock exchange websites. 
Independent Variables 
Characteristics of competitive repertoires. I draw attention to three characteristics 
of a firm‘s competitive repertoire: strategic complexity, strategic heterogeneity, and stra-
tegic volume. 
Strategic complexity. To measure the extent to which a firm‘s competitive reper-
toires consist of a broad range (as compared to a narrow range) of different action types, I 
used a Herfindahl-type index that accounts for the weighted diversity among all 10 action 
types (Ferrier et al. 1999; Ferrier 2001). The Herfindahl index is commonly used to 
measure the level of diversification across industry categories in the diversification litera-
ture (Montgomery 1985). This index takes into account both the number of action catego-
ries and the degree of concentration of actions within each category. For example, a com-
petitive repertoire dominated mainly by marketing actions is considered a simple reper-
toire. By contrast, those that have a relative representative balance among the possible ac-
tion types are more complex. The measure of the complexity was calculated as follows: 
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Strategic Complexity 
= 1 - 
a
(N a /NT L )
2  
where N a /NT L  is the share or proportion of competitive actions in the ath action catego-
ry. Thus, a firm with a low action complexity score favored just a few action types. Con-
versely, a firm with a high complexity score employed a broad range of action types. 
Strategic heterogeneity. To measure how different each firm‘s strategic reper-
toires are relative to others in the industry, I used a Euclidean-like distance score. I calcu-
lated the frequency of each type of action (pricing, marketing, product, and so on) by 
each competitor that accounts for the weighted diversity among all different action types. 
I then calculated a difference score between the competitive action repertoires for the 
firms relative to the industry average. 
Strategic Heterogeneity 
 
= a  






T
a
T
a
F
F
I
I 2
 
where I a  and F a  are the industry average of the frequency competitive actions in the ath 
action category and the frequency of firm‘s competitive actions in that category, respec-
tively. The terms I T  and F T  represent industry and firm total actions, respectively. These 
difference scores are taken at the monthly level. High scores indicate that a firm carries 
out very different competitive strategies from its rivals, whereas low scores indicate that 
the firms carry out a mix of competitive actions very similar to other firms in the indus-
try. 
Strategic Volume. To measure the extent to which a firm sustains competitive re-
pertoires of considerable volume, I calculated the number of competitive moves carried 
out each month, which is consistent with prior research (Ferrier et al. 1999; Young et al. 
1996). 
Controls. As research in finance has shown that firm size significantly impacts 
stock returns, I controlled for firm size for both short interest and CARS (King 1966; 
Banz 1981). I used total assets as a measure of firm size and took the log of this. As firm 
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age has a significant effect on stock returns (Pastor and Veronesi 2003), I also controlled 
for firm age for both short interest and CARS, which I measured as years since founding. 
I looked up each firm‘s age independently using the Google search engine. To measure 
financial performance, I used Altman‘s Z-score, which is a weighted composite of finan-
cial indicators relating to profitability, revenue, debt/equity, slack resources, and market 
return (Chakravarthy 1986).
 
 
Z-score = 1.2 working capital + 1.4 retained earnings + 3.3 operating income + sales + .6 net worth 
        total assets                        total debt 
 
High Z-scores indicate a condition of strong financial health; low Z-scores indi-
cate risk of bankruptcy. 
To control for different levels of absorbed slack and resource allocations that 
could impact returns and varying levels of short interest, I included R&D intensity, capi-
tal intensity, and advertising intensity. R&D intensity reflects the extent to which a com-
pany chooses to invest in the development of new products or processes and is also am-
biguous in it relationship to risk. R&D expenditures can be seen either as huge capital 
burns or as competitive buffers that will impact risk and returns. R&D intensity is defined 
as R&D spending/total sales. 
Similarly, advertising expenses could be perceived as positive or negative. In the 
case of firms such as Pfizer who has created a strong brand image for Viagra, advertising 
expenditures may be perceived as positive because they have created a powerful brand 
loyalty element, but costly, less effective campaigns could negatively impact perceived 
value. Advertising intensity is defined as advertising spending/total sales. 
Brealy and Myers (2002) demonstrated that capital intensity is an important com-
ponent of the value of a firm because the proportion of fixed expenses in a firm‘s cost 
structure is represented. One would logically conclude that fixed expenses would be more 
risky because they would reduce the flexibility of the firm.. Capital intensity is defined as 
net fixed assets/total book assets. Ferri and Jones (1979) found that this measure provided 
the most reliable and significant discrimination among different leverage groups com-
pared with other operating leverage measures. 
Control Variables- Short Interest Models 
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Optioned stocks. Controlling for noninformation-based determinants of short sell-
ing is common in the finance literature. Scholars have argued that short sales in stocks 
that have options attached to them are less likely to be informative. Diamond and Verrec-
chia (1987) argued that introducing option contracts on a stock reduces the costs asso-
ciated with short-selling, because option strategies allow traders to mimic short-selling 
strategies. Brent et al. (1990), Aitken et al. (1998), and Graham, Hughen, and McDonald 
(1999) argued that the use of options is associated with the use of short-selling for hedg-
ing and options arbitrage purposes, which must be controlled for when looking at infor-
mation-based reasons for short-selling. In addition to options arbitrage and hedging ef-
fects on short interest, the option market may provide a substitute for short-selling 
through synthetic construction of short position. 
The American Stock Exchange has established the following guidelines to be consi-
dered in evaluating a security for options trading: 
 Public float of the underlying security: 7.0 million shares. The public float ex-
cludes shares held by officers, directors and controlling shareholders (those hold-
ing 10 percent or more of the shares). 
 Holders of the underlying security: 2,000. 
 Shares of the underlying security traded: 2.4 million shares traded in the twelve 
months preceding listing. 
 Either: 
i) the price of the underlying security has been at least $3.00 per share for the 5 
business days preceding the selection date or 
ii)  
(1) underlying security meets the guidelines for continued approval; 
(2) options on the underlying security are traded on at least one other regis-
tered national securities exchange; and 
(3) the average daily volume for the option over the three calendar months 
preceding the date of selection has been at least 5,000 contracts. Issuer of 
underlying security is in compliance with any applicable requirements of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
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The fact that a security meets the guidelines does not necessarily mean that it will 
be approved as an underlying security. Furthermore, in exceptional circumstances, the 
Exchange may approve a security as an underlying security even though it does not meet 
all of the guidelines 
To control for options arbitrage, I constructed a dummy variable to indicate 
whether the stock has traded options. I obtained this information from Poweropt.com, 
which provides a complete list of all stocks that have tradable options. The option dum-
my variable has a value of 1 if a stock has traded options and 0 otherwise. 
Control Variables- CARS Models 
Short interest. I previously demonstrated that short interest has a sizable impact 
on stock returns. Dechow et al. (2001) found that for firms with no short positions, the 
average one-year-ahead abnormal return is 2.3%, while for firms with over 5% shorted, 
the average abnormal return is negative 18.1%. For each of the categories with short posi-
tions, the average abnormal return is significantly lower than the average abnormal return 
for the firm-years with no short positions (the authors sort firm-years into six categories 
based on the magnitude of the short position in the stock). Thus, when running analysis 
for CARS, I controlled for levels of short interest. 
My study includes a very important departure from previous studies in competi-
tive dynamics (Chen and Hambrick 1995; Ferrier et al. 1999; Ferrier 2001; Miller and 
Chen 1994, 1996; Young, Smith, Grimm, and Simon 2000) in that the competitive reper-
toires were analyzed at the monthly as opposed to the annual level. This is important 
when measuring how investors act because their short term focus generally makes the 
annual level of analysis meaningless. In fact, the focus on short term results by Wall 
Street investors is so prevalent that a 2005 survey of more than 400 financial executives 
found that 80% of the respondents said they would decrease discretionary spending on 
such areas as research and development, advertising, maintenance, and hiring to meet 
short-term earnings targets (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005). Thus, because both 
investors and managers are focused on the short term, my departure from the annual level 
of analysis is appropriate to my research question. 
Analysis 
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Means, standard deviations, and correlations are presented in Table 2. Examina-
tion of the correlations produced no serious concerns regarding multicollinearity. 
To control for autocorrelation within each firm, I ran a mixed, fixed-effects re-
gression analysis that accounted for time by including each observation‘s month-year as a 
separate effect, which is formulated as follows: 
Y it  = α i  + γ t + β‘ xit + ε it   
where α i is the effect of a firm i; γ t  is the month-year t effect; β‘ xit is the coefficient 
(slope) that is assumed to be constant across firms; and ε it  are the errors that are assumed 
to be independent and identically distributed. Indeed, owing to the cross-sectional time 
panel structure of our data, most of the autocorrelation (AR1) covariance estimates were 
significant, indicating the presence of serial correlation. This regression technique pro-
duces regression coefficients that account for this important influence. I ran a mixed 
model with fixed firm and time effects for all independent variables, and a first order au-
tocorrelation structure for the error terms within a firm. These results are presented in 
Table 3. 
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Table 2 
 
Control Mean
Std. 
Deviation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Age 25.555 15.7177
2. Altmans Z 5.7034 26.8423 -.044**
3. Size 2.3742 1.09964 .665** .149**
4. OptionedStock 0.4388 0.49627 .199** .126** .386**
5. R&D Intesity 3.0214 19.4192 -.110**  -.029* -.124** -.056**
6. Capital Intensity 0.1769 0.13363 .355** -.153** .124** -.124** -.002
7. Advertising Intensity 0.1015 0.10466 -.196** -.174** -.289**    .001 .092** -.174**
Independent
8. Complexity 0.0493 0.15879 .214**   .008 .271** .118** -.032* .056**  -.009
9. Heterogeneity 0.0042 0.27566 .077**  -.008 .110** .042** -0.019 .042**   .003 .399**
10. Volume 0.0887 0.47606 -.034**  -.002 .074** -.095** -0.018 .060**  -.036   .009 .052**
Dependent
11. CARS 1.9842 35.3827    .019   .002  -.004  -.006  -.005  .026   .059*  -.004 .003 -.021
12. SIR 0.0086 0.02063 -.051**   .033 -.051** .094**   .045* -.097** .113**  -.019 .005 -.008 .016
p<.05*
p<.01**
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Table 3 
 
   Stock Returns    Short Interest Ratio  
   Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6 
Intercept .8398 -.5449  -1.792 .0127** .0227** .0076*** 
Firm Age .2180** .2240** .2618** .00009 -.0009*** -.00005 
Altman‘s Z .1765 .0334  -.1103 -.00004*** -.0002** -.00004*** 
Firm Size  -2.335  -2.540  -3.378** -.0027 .0019 -.0002 
Short Interest Ratio -13.509  64.528  61.006    
Optioned Stock    .0107** .0170 .0028** 
R&D Intensity -.0894 -.0499 -.1014 .0006 .0674 .0031 
Capital Intensity -35.791** -36.192** -26.847* .0061* .1898   1.138* 
Advertising Intensity    7.194   9.099  14.146 .0279 .5468 -.3756 
Strategic Complexity   28.666   -.0007   
Strategic Heterogeneity  -8.689**   -.0046**  
Strategic Volume    3.292**   -.0007** 
(Strategic Complexity)
2
  -62.825      
(Strategic Heterogeneity)
2
     .0011**  
(Strategic Volume)
2
      .0002** 
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Results 
As stated in hypotheses 1 and 2, I predicted that the complexity of a firm‘s strate-
gy will exhibit an inverted U-shaped relationship with stock returns and a negative rela-
tionship with short interest. As reported in Table 3 above, neither hypothesis is supported. 
Hypothesis 3 was supported (b = -8.69; p<.05). The heterogeneity of a firm‘s stra-
tegic repertoire exhibits a negative relationship with stock returns. Hypothesis 4, which 
predicted that the heterogeneity of a firm‘s strategic repertoire will exhibit a nonlinear re-
lationship with short interest, was partially supported. While the cubed term was not sig-
nificant, the main effect and the squared terms were both significant (b = -.004; p<.05)   
(b = .001; p<.05). This indicates that strategic heterogeneity demonstrates a U-shaped re-
lationship with short interest. 
Hypothesis 5 was also supported (b = 3.9; p<.05). The larger the volume of a 
firm‘s strategic repertoire, the higher its stock returns. Hypothesis 6 too was supported (b 
= -.0007; p<.05), (b = .0002; p<.05). The volume of a firm‘s strategic repertoire exhibits 
a U-shaped relationship with short interest. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Within the field of competitive dynamics, competitive actions are seen as a major 
factor that contributes to the performance differentials across companies (Bettis and 
Weeks 1987; Miller and Chen 1994, 1996, Ferrier et al. 1999; Ferrier 2001; Ferrier and 
Lee 2002). Thus, integration of financial theories that prescribe how this area of strategy 
contributes to firm value is a logical step in answering the call set forth by Bettis (1983, 
414): 
… there is a need for strategic management researchers to establish closer 
working relationships with finance scholars…ultimately such cross com-
munication is essential, or else practitioners will be forced to select among 
contradictory paradigms—a most undesirable circumstance. 
 
Competitive dynamics in strategy research maintains that to understand the out-
comes of competition, one must examine and evaluate the collective actions of compa-
nies (a strategic repertoire), and how this repertoire will impact the future value of the 
firm. While the field of competitive dynamics has yielded noteworthy results, and in gen-
eral made considerable progress theoretically over the past two decades, many important 
questions remain unanswered, particularly with respect to Bettis‘s (1983) call. 
My dissertation stands among the first attempts to integrate financial and strategic 
theory in competitive dynamics by developing strategic asset pricing theory (STRAPT). 
In developing this theory, I address the following questions: What do investors think? 
How do they perceive and evaluate a series of competitive actions as they unfold? How 
do they come to conclusions about the impact these strategies will have on the future 
earnings growth that ultimately affects a firm‘s equity shares? And, who are these inves-
tors? 
In answering these questions, I look to whether investors scan, analyze, and in-
terpret the value-creating potential associated with the competitive interaction—the pace, 
intensity, and pattern of dynamic competitive rivalry. In doing so, I present the four stag-
es of STRAPT. First, I describe the overall decision-making process as informed by so-
cial judgment theory. Second, I explain the manner in which investors ―code‖ this infor-
mation as evidenced by information theory. Third, I describe what makes these patterns 
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of cues noticed by investors. In accomplishing these first three objectives, I justify why 
coding schemes such as strategic heterogeneity and volume are appropriate in competi-
tive dynamics research. Fourth, I examine the decision-making processes of long buyers 
and short-sellers, and consider how the combination of these cognitive principles leads to 
evaluations of corporate strategies by these two classes of investors, resulting in changes 
in stock returns and short interest. 
Also, and quite importantly, I challenge the applicability of the efficient-markets 
hypothesis in finance to strategy research by attesting that all investors do not come to the 
same conclusions. According to Preuschoff, Quartz, and Bossaerts (2005), neoclassical 
finance, from which the efficient-markets hypothesis arises, assumes that humans take in 
information and convert it into actions, blindly applying certain rules called ―rational de-
cision-making.‖ This area of finance ignores how decision-makers perceive complex en-
vironments and how they process this information to make choices. ―As a theory of hu-
man decision making, this approach has really never worked‖ (Preuschoff et al. 2005, 2). 
Indeed, the emerging field of behavioral finance has shown that numerous factors affect 
how investors form opinions about stocks (Hirshleifer 2001), implying that not all inves-
tors always act rationally or in the same manner. Thus, I test models for two classes of 
investors—long-buyers and short-sellers—who, I believe, given very different levels of 
cost and risk will use different decision-making processes, and ultimately come to differ-
ent conclusions about the strategic patterns they observe. 
Drawing from core ideas in competitive dynamics and cognitive psychology, I 
demonstrate that long-buyers and short-sellers are influenced by specific dimensions that 
describe how a firm‘s competitive strategy unfolds over time. My development of 
STRAPT and results from testing combine to advance strategy theory by providing addi-
tional understanding of the model of the processes by which investors form ideas about 
firms‘ competitive strategies and their ultimate beliefs about the impact these strategies 
will have on stock prices. Specifically, I unify several areas of psychological thought that 
have yet to be cohesively applied to investor decision-making about strategy. In doing so, 
I also inform managers as to the optimal level of strategic heterogeneity and volume to 
appeal to these two important groups of outsiders. 
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First, investors‘ type influences the decision-making processes investors use and 
the amount of effort they will expend due to differing costs and risks inherent in the stock 
transactions they undertake. Throughout this dissertation I consistently argue that long-
buyers use a less effortful heuristic decision-making process, and that short-sellers use a 
more thoughtful or systematic decision-making process. My findings of how long-buyers 
regard between-firm differences in the pattern of competitive actions the firm carries out 
over time, or strategic heterogeneity, are generally supportive of Miller and Chen (1996) 
who posited that distinctive processes such as heterogeneous strategies may do more 
harm than good by decreasing the ―legitimacy‖ of the firm. The long-buyer, using the 
recognition heuristic, does not assign value to this variety, and tends to reward firms that 
adhere more closely to the status quo. At first, short-sellers—undertaking a more syste-
matic evaluation of the strategy at hand—subscribe to Porter‘s (1980) view that hetero-
geneous competitive repertoires confuse rivals and thus create value by catching them off 
guard. More specifically, in the context of fierce competitive rivalry, short-sellers value 
the firm‘s ability to out-maneuver rivals through differentiation (carrying out a pattern of 
actions different from rivals). However, as the strategy becomes increasingly different 
from that of referent others, the short-seller apparently believes the firm is straying too 
far from the core business conduct within the industry, and is ―out in left field‖ with re-
gard to the strategy‘s potential to add value. This results in a U-shaped relationship with 
short interest. So it appears that Miller and Chen‘s and Deephouses‘ (1996) theories on 
the benefits of isomorphism apply to both types of investors, but for short-sellers, this 
happens further along the homogeneous–heterogeneous continuum. This is consistent 
with Deephouse (1999), who argued that the nature of the relationship between competi-
tive nonconformity (heterogeneity) and performance depends on the size of the deviation 
from established norms. Short-sellers adhere to the strategic balance proposition that 
moderately differentiated firms have higher performance than either highly conforming 
or highly differentiated firms. Thus, rather than simply ceasing short-sales activity as he-
terogeneity increases beyond a judicious level, short sellers apparently believe that radi-
cal deviations will encounter institutional forces resulting in negative future performance. 
My findings pertaining to how long-buyers value the number of strategic moves 
carried out by a firm generally support the Young, et al (1996), and Ferrier (2001) views 
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that that more rather than fewer strategic moves are good for firm outcomes. Specifically, 
I demonstrate that long-buyers value exposure to the firm, and this translates into positive 
stock market returns. Short-sellers, on the other hand, see the value of a large number of 
strategic actions only to an extent. Through their systematic analysis, they then subscribe 
to the Porter (1985) and Shamsie (1990) viewpoint that more is not always better. This 
results in a U-shaped relationship with short interest. 
Findings that relate to within-firm differences, or strategic complexity, are not 
significant. This insignificance could indicate that neither type of investor evaluates strat-
egies on this continuum. Further research should be conducted in this area to determine 
whether and why this is the case. This investigation could be done in the form of surveys 
of both classes of investment professionals to determine whether there is an intra-firm 
difference measure that strategy researchers have yet to consider. 
One possible reason for these nonfindings is that within firms, investors may regard 
certain types of strategic actions as more important in creating future value than others, 
thus disregarding many of the other elements of ―strategy.‖ My model did not test for the 
relative importance of each type of strategic action to investors. If one type of action was 
a great deal more important for investor evaluations of firm-specific strategies, this may 
preclude cognitive development of the actual complexity of the strategy, because by fo-
cusing on one or two elements, a pattern such as this would not emerge. Indeed, in an un-
published working paper, Bridoux and Smith (2008) examined which types of actions are 
most beneficial for firm performance. They showed that actions in product markets, or 
output actions, have the largest impact on performance (operating profit). If products are 
the most important type of strategic action, in the context of the pharmaceutical industry, 
investors may take a real options perspective to evaluating the worth of the equity shares 
based on internal actions. This is because in the pharmaceutical industry, product devel-
opment processes are lengthy and costly. A negative vote on a drug by an FDA panel or a 
failed clinical trial can have severe consequences for a company‘s future earnings. Thus, 
investors may wisely pay much closer attention to the progression of drugs to market ra-
ther than elements of strategy such as pricing or promotion. Adding to the logic that they 
take a real options perspective is that following the progress of a drug candidate to mar-
ket is actually quite easy and methodical. Results of various stages of clinical trial 
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progress are widely publicized, and as the drug progresses through trial stages 1, 2, and 3, 
the risk of failure diminishes significantly. 
Pragmatics and Practice 
Indeed, ―… strategic investments and tactical moves influence the uncertainty of 
future income streams and reduce information asymmetry between the firm and the 
broader investment community‖ (Chatterjee, Wiseman, Feigenbaum, and Devers 2003, 
76). In my dissertation, I demonstrate that beyond traditional valuation tools, investors in-
terpret strategic actions as cues, and assign value to a series of these cues based on well-
documented cognitive principles. Also, different classes of investors take different ap-
proaches to the assessment and evaluation of the cues as they are successively an-
nounced. I also introduce a new and potentially fruitful line of inquiry in the strategy lite-
rature, the evaluation of strategic principles by a class of investors deemed to be very in-
formed—short-sellers (Diamond and Verrechia 1987). 
In developing STRAPT, I demonstrate that long-buyers use behavioral/action-
based analysis in addition to current performance outcomes, and believe this departure 
from prescribed financial theory is indeed a rational valuation strategy for investors be-
cause ―through the purposeful commitment to a course of action…companies can seize 
and defend a valuable market position‖ (Lubatkin, Schulze, McNulty, and Yeh 2003, 86). 
As posited by Christophe et al. (2004), I also demonstrate that short-sellers use this ac-
tion-based inquiry in their analyses. Therefore, rivalry may be viewed as an under-
explored component of abnormal returns and short sales, whereby competitive strategy is 
defined and characterized as the unfolding of competitive moves carried out by rivals in 
strategic time. 
In addition to advances in the integration of financial theories with strategic man-
agement, STRAPT also has strong managerial implications. With respect to the market 
for managerial talent, managers (and management teams) that are able to better control 
stock prices and short interest will command a premium for employment as they can po-
tentially have a greater impact on shareholder value. Accordingly, those that have a better 
understanding of the mechanisms by which investors make decisions and ascribe value to 
various strategic patterns will be at an advantage in both the competitive and employment 
marketplace. Additionally, since most compensation packages for top managers are 
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closely tied to stock price (Sahadi 2006), strategy researchers and practitioners alike 
should investigate the mechanisms by which to control stock prices, and an understand-
ing of the thought processes of those ultimately in control—investors—is a good start. 
Limitations 
This study is a theoretical study that uses secondary data to test the hypotheses. 
Therefore, the central limitations of this study concern the appropriateness of the meas-
ures used to test the hypotheses put forth. First, the conceptual portion is founded on 
theories developed in behavioral finance and cognitive psychology. While the latter body 
of knowledge has been thoroughly developed and rigorously tested under experimental 
circumstances for many decades, the former is a new and somewhat controversial field 
that has emerged in the finance literature. While the suppositions seem logical, it under-
mines decades of work in the formation and testing of asset pricing theory. For instance, 
the notions of the rational investor and market equilibrium are called into question, and I 
have assumed behavioral finance scholars have disproved asset pricing theory. Therefore, 
if one strictly subscribes to the theories and suppositions put forth in neoclassical finance, 
my findings would have no relevance. Furthermore, since this is one of the first studies to 
apply psychological principles to the theory of competitive dynamics and propose out-
comes, it may be possible to criticize the approach, despite carefully developed argu-
ments to justify its relevance. 
In addition, there are problems with the design and data. The use of only second-
ary data could be problematic. This study could be improved with primary data collection 
through interviews with and surveys of the very individuals whose thought processes I 
am trying to suppose—long-buyers and short-sellers. In addition, testing hypotheses in 
only one industry limits generalizability. As noted in the nonfindings for strategic com-
plexity, investors may regard certain types of strategic actions to be more important in 
one industry than another. This could lead investors to form conclusions about the viabili-
ty of overall patterns of strategies in some industries, while ignoring these patterns alto-
gether in others. 
Future Directions 
Logical progressions of this study and the advancement of strategic asset pricing 
theory include further study into the cognitions of these two classes of investors with re-
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gard to other areas in the strategy arena where patterns are evaluated for future earnings-
creating potential. Since my results reveal that investors tend to focus on the interaction 
or heterogeneity between firms more than the intra-firm differences, a logical extension is 
to evaluate how investors interpret the interconnectedness of relationships between firms. 
According to Gulati (1998), the strategic conduct of firms in an industry is influenced not 
only by the properties of their relationships taken one at a time, but also by the overall 
structure of interfirm relationship networks. This social networks perspective builds on 
the general notion that economic actions are influenced by the social context in which 
they are embedded and that actions can be influenced by the position of actors in social 
networks (Gulati 1998, 295). Thus, it follows that the competitive dynamic posture of a 
firm can be in part deduced from its position in a social network. Also, according to 
Fombrun and Shanley (1990, 233), ―publics construct reputation on the basis of informa-
tion about a firm‘s relative structural positions within organizational fields.‖ So in es-
sence, these structural positions act as signals or cues of firm quality to investors; thus the 
question, ―Do firms benefit from entering strategic alliances?‖ (Gulati 1998, 309), can be 
examined by assessing investors‘ evaluations of the network of alliances. Fombrun and 
Shanley (1990) go further to confer that institutional signals indicating conformity to so-
cial norms and strategic signals indicating strategic postures are key elements of the repu-
tation-forming process. It follows that the strategic postures firms develop based on the 
conformity imposed by various types of social networks should be studied, and the per-
formance outcomes from these, such as stock returns and short interest, should be empiri-
cally examined. 
A second logical extension is to test reverse causality, which would explore the 
question ―do managers adjust strategies based on signals from Wall Street?‖ Several eco-
nomic scholars have explored similar questions. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that 
stock prices serve to monitor management. Since the implications of managers‘ decisions 
are reflected in stock prices, investors have incentives to influence corporate policies, 
even replacing management teams if necessary. Likewise, since compensation structures 
of many top managers are closely tied to stock price, managers have incentives to listen 
to investors (Kau, Linck, and Rubin, 2008). Dye and Sridhar (2002), argue that listening 
to investors may be a wise strategy for managers since capital markets can be better in-
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formed than the firm itself. However, Roll (1986) argued that managers may not heed 
market signals due to their belief that they know their company and industry better than 
outside investors. Thus, since economic scholars are at odds regarding this question, it 
may be a fruitful line of inquiry in strategy research. 
Conclusion 
I hope that my study serves to kindle scholarly interest in how other managerially 
influenced organizational behaviors and characteristics affect the way in which patterns 
of firm behavior are perceived and ascribed. Toward this end, I think that strategy scho-
lars are well positioned to contribute, given our field‘s assumption of imperfect markets 
and our focus on the firm-environment interface. Recognizing that ―human behavior is 
bewilderingly complex and heterogeneous‖ (Preuschoff, et al. 2005, 2), we can perhaps 
come to a better understanding of how human heterogeneity affects the decision-making 
processes that lead to different evaluations of the interaction between firms. Indeed, the 
distinctive role of strategy research among the social sciences has always been its capaci-
ty to integrate economic and behavioral theories with our understanding of the firm to 
provide insights and guidance to individuals who manage them. 
Post-hoc Analyses 
 I ran several post-hoc analyses to attempt to derive additional insight into corpo-
rate actions that influence investor perceptions of a corporations viability, and thus stock 
returns and short interest. First, I ran fixed effects models for each action category inde-
pendently.  Results were insignificant for the most part indicating that investors tend to 
analyze the totality of the actions rather than each action in isolation. The one that did 
show significance was clinical trail announcements on stock returns which had a negative 
impact (b = -3.09; p<.05). A review of these announcements showed that most of them 
were positive outcomes. This is counterintuitive because progression through clinical 
trails should have positive influence on future earning perceptions so what explains this 
finding? Wall Street has a well known saying ―by the rumor, sell the news‖. An extreme 
example of this occurred on May 10, 2000 when investors bought the rumor and sold the 
news of Cisco Systems beating earnings forecasts, sending shares of Cisco Systems 
plunging 4-1/4 to 58-1/2, following the networker's better-than-expected quarterly earn-
ings. After reporting, the stock fell victim to a bout of profit taking substantial enough to 
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drive down the entire NYSE.  These results were not significant for short interest which 
suggests that short-sellers do not subscribe to this adage, however, results are difficult to 
interpret as I do not have short interest data for the actual day, only the month in which 
the event occurred. 
 I also lagged each of the action-related variables by 1, 2, and 3 months.  The only 
significant result of this analysis was strategic heterogeneity impacted short interest in a 
U-shaped manner for the 1 month lag. This suggests that short-sellers value heterogeneity 
only up to a certain level and evaluate these types of strategies over the previous two 
months.  As such, short-sellers are taking a longer-term analytical approach to these types 
of differentiated strategies than long buyers, further supporting my proposition regarding 
the systematic nature of their decision-making processes. 
 Third, I did a split sample analysis on firm size and firm performance (CARS) for 
each class of investor. In the analysis regarding size for long-buyers, strategic hetero-
geneity impacted returns negatively only for large firms, and volume positively only for 
large firms. This suggests that long-buyers more closely analyze the strategies of large 
firms which likely because these firms comprise a larger percentage of their overall port-
folio. Results for the short-seller for size did not differ from those of the sample in its en-
tirety. This suggests that short-sellers closely analyze all firms in which they have short 
positions because an incorrect call on a small firm can be just as devastating as for a large 
one.  
 The analysis regarding performance for long-buyers revealed that strategic hete-
rogeneity only had a negative impact on stock returns for high performance firms, and no 
impact for those in the low performance set. A possible explanation for this is if a firm is 
not performing well, investors are not concerned with the strategy of the firm but more 
the financial ratios.  Results for short-sellers showed a U-shaped relationship for strategic 
heterogeneity for high performance firms, but no relationship for low performance firms. 
Once again, if a firm‘s stock is not performing, the short-seller may not be concerned 
about strategy, but look more to financial ratios. Results pertaining to volume for short-
sellers indicate a U-shaped relationship for high performance firms and a positive rela-
tionship for low performing firms. The results for high performing firms correspond to 
those of the sample in its entirety. The results for the low performing firms suggest that 
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when performance is down, short-sellers believe that channeling resources towards larger 
numbers of strategic moves could erode the financial position of an already faltering firm. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Sociological 
(Studies of 
Competitor 
Actions 
Based on 
Focal Firm) 
Time Level 
of 
Analysis 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables 
Smith, 
Grimm, 
Gannon and 
Chen 1991 
 
Annual Action-
Reaction 
Dyad 
Type of action: strategic (significant 
commitments of specific, distinctive re-
sources and are difficult to implement and 
reverse) vs. tactical (easy to implement, 
reversible actions) 
 
Response likelihood: number of times each 
airline responded to competitors‘ actions/ the 
number of times the firm had an opportunity to 
respond 
Response imitation: binary variable, with a 
value of 1 when the type of response was the 
same as the type of action 
Response lag: amount of time was measured 
by the difference between the data of the first 
report of a specific competitive action in Avia-
tion Daily and the date a response was re-
ported 
Response order: rank position in time of a 
responding firm among all responders, calcu-
lated by averaging each airline‘s actual rank 
position in the order of responders for each ac-
tion for each year 
 
Chen, Smith, 
and Grimm 
1992 
Action Action- 
Reaction 
Dyad 
Competitive impact: sum total of the 
competitors actually affected by an action. 
Competitors affected by each action were 
Number of responses was defined as the total 
number of competitors who actually 
Response lag: the number of days between the 
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Chen, Smith, 
and Grimm 
1992 
(cont.) 
further defined as those airlines which 
provided service in at least one of the 
sample airports affected by the action 
Attack intensity: among passengers 
served by an airline in the year an action 
was taken, the proportion of those passen-
gers affected by that action 
Implementation requirement: amount of 
time spent preparing to execute that ac-
tion. The time difference between the date 
Aviation Daily reported an action and the 
date that action was executed as indicated 
in the journal 
Type of action: strategic (significant 
commitments of specific, distinctive re-
sources and are difficult to implement and 
reverse) vs. tactical (easy to implement, 
reversible actions) 
move 
date a specific action was first reported in Avi-
ation Daily and the date that journal first made 
public the airline‘s response 
Chen and 
Miller 1994 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Event 
and An-
nual 
Action-
reaction 
dyad 
Action visibility:  three scales to assess 
how visible each type of attack might be 
to rivals (first two derived from question-
naires sent to top executives). 
- amount of industry publicity asso-
ciated with each move 
- likelihood that this type of attack 
would be publicly announced by top 
management. 
- number of lines of print in Aviation 
Daily associated with each move 
Response difficulty: five scales is the 
Number of responses: the number of airlines 
that responded to an action 
Response ratio: All competitive responses di-
rected towards the actions of a given firm in a 
given year / the total number of actions made 
by that firm in that year 
 
DV 2 
Performance: (IV: response ratio) 
total operating revenue per revenue passenger 
mile (RPM) 
- operating profit per RPM 
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Chen and 
Miller 1994 
(cont.) 
ease with which a competitor can respond 
in kind to an attack (first four derived 
from questionnaires sent to top executives, 
fifth, author derived). 
- estimated financial expense 
- disruption of staff and systems 
- amount of relocation of staff or 
equipment required 
- the need for complex coordination 
among different functional depart-
ments 
- overall perceived difficulty of making 
the move 
Centrality of attack: proportion of an-
nual passengers affected.  Aggregate in-
dex for each action 
was obtained by averaging the centrality 
measures for each affected airline. 
Potential benefit of the attack: number 
of attackers‘ passengers affected by the 
action aggregated for all the actions made 
by a given attacker in a given year. 
 
- profit margin 
Standard and Poor‘s published stock ratings 
for each airline for each year. 
 
Interaction terms: 
Visibility x difficulty 
Centrality x difficulty 
Visibility x centrality 
Visibility x centrality x difficulty 
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Sociological 
(Studies of 
Firm Charac-
teristics Im-
pact on  Firm 
Behavior) 
 
 
    
Fombrun 
and Gins-
berg 1990 
 
 
 
Annual NA Organizational inertia: firm size (loga-
rithm of total employees) 
Firm performance: return on assets (ratio 
of operating income to total assets) 
Sector volatility: sale volatility coeffi-
cients of individual firms within a sector. 
Because the aggressiveness of firms can 
be influenced by other forces, dummies f 
or manufacturing/service, capital intensi-
ty) were included. 
Corporate aggressiveness: 
index of which three dimensions 
- emphasis on product development (alloca-
tions to R&D as a percentage of sales) 
- emphasis on market development (allocations 
to market development as a percentage of 
sales) 
- willingness to take a risky position in the 
capital markets (debt - equity ratio) 
 
Lant, Milli-
ken, and Ba-
tra 1992 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annual NA Environmental turbulence: relative rates 
of strategic reorientation 
Past performance: return on assets rela-
tive to industry average 
Managerial interpretations: 
 Environment - coded from the 198610K 
and annual reports. An indication of 
whether or not a firm mentioned changes or 
their expectations of changes in environ-
mental contingencies. A firm‘s managers 
were coded as being aware of environmen-
tal contingencies if they indicated explicitly 
that they had observed or were predicting a 
Strategic reorientation: a change in business 
strategy coupled with change in other key or-
ganizational dimensions. Thus, a change in 
business strategy is a necessary but not suffi-
cient condition for strategic reorientation. 13 
identifiable strategies that the companies in the 
samples used to compete in their industries 
were coded from the 10K.  A company was 
coded as having changed strategies when they 
either did not mention a strategy they had indi-
cated in 1984, or when they mentioned a new 
strategy that had nor been indicated in 1984. 
Change in organizational structure was coded 
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Lant, Milli-
ken and Ba-
tra 1992 
(cont.) 
specific change in their organization‘s en-
vironment. 
 Past performance - obtained from content 
analysis of the management discussion in 
the 10K reports and the president‘s letter in 
the annual reports in 1986. Coded each 
mention of a performance outcome as be-
ing positive or negative. Then coded the 
reason given for that outcome as being in-
ternal or external. 
Top management team functional hete-
rogeneity 
CEO and top management team turno-
ver - A change in the CEO was coded 
when the CEO or president changed with-
in the given time period. Change in the 
management team was measured as a per-
centage variable. 
 
when there was evidence of a major change in 
structure, such as a change from a functional to 
a divisional organization, between the 1984 
and 1986 10K reports. 
CEO and top management team turnover 
(IV past performance): change in the CEO 
coded when CEO or president changed within 
the given time period. Change in management 
team was measured as a percentage variable. 
Top management team functional hetero-
geneity (IV past performance) 
Managerial interpretations: (IV past per-
formance) 
Environment - coded from the 1986 10K and 
annual reports. An indication of whether or not 
a firm mentioned changes or their expectations 
of changes in environmental contingencies. A 
firm‘s managers were coded as being aware of 
environmental contingencies if they indicated 
explicitly that they had observed or were pre-
dicting a specific change in their organiza-
tion‘s environment. 
Past performance - obtained from content 
analysis of the management discussion in the 
10K reports and the president‘s letter in the 
annual reports in 1986. Coded each mention of 
a performance outcome as being positive or 
negative. Then coded the reason given for that 
outcome as being internal or external.  
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Wiersema 
and Bantel 
1992 
Total-
1980-
1983 
NA Top management team characteristics Strategic change - the absolute percentage 
change in diversification strategy over the pe-
riod 1980-83. Measured with Jacquemin and 
Berry‘s (1979) entropy measure of diversifica-
tion, which captures both the extent of diversi-
ty across a firm‘s activities and the related ver-
sus unrelated elements of diversity (Palepu 
1985). 
 
where Pj is the percentage of a firm‘s total 
sales in the ith segment and N is the number of 
the firm‘s businesses. 
Hambrick, 
Geletkanycz, 
and Fre-
drickson 
1993 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One time 
questio-
nnaire 
NA Commitment to the Status Quo 
Leadership CSQ – survey measure  - de-
gree to which the respondent (mostly 
CEO) believes the 
firm‘s ideal CEO in the Year 2000 should 
be similar to the current CEO, in terms of 
expertise and behaviors 
Strategy CSQ – two sets of items in the 
questionnaire which dealt with competi-
tive weapons (e.g., low price, premium 
image; 11 items in total) and growth strat-
egies (e.g., acquisitions in industries new 
to the firm, internal development of new 
businesses seven items in total). 
Organizational tenure - years 
Industry tenure – years 
Interaction term (performance) 
CSQ x Industry discretion 
Performance 
4-point item: question on how would you de-
scribe the profitability of your 
firm?‘ 1 = unprofitable, 2 = breaking even, 3 = 
moderately profitable, 4 = very profitable. 
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Hambrick, 
Geletkanycz, 
and Fre-
drickson 
1993 
(cont.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry discretion: 
high-discretion environments: low capital 
intensity, product differentiability, low 
degree of regulation, and high market 
growth. 
low-discretion environments: highly capi-
tal intensive, commodity products, high 
degree of regulation, and generally low 
growth. 
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Miller and 
Chen 1994 
Annual Competi-
tive 
repertoire 
Past performance: revenue per available 
seat mile flown 
Competitive experience: Prior year 
competitive inertia: market growth: an-
nual change in total Revenue seat mile 
flown for domestic airlines 
market diversity: Composite index of 
number of different airports served ands 
number of competitors faced by each 
company 
Company age and size (log of number of 
employees) 
Competitive Inertia: index representing the 
number of decisions in each of the j (=1,…,21) 
action type categories for each of the compa-
nies in given year.  Scores were standardized 
to avoid overweighting most common types.  
The activity index is the sum of the standar-
dized scores/number of decision types (21) and 
then divided by the log of the revenue passen-
ger miles.  Tactical and strategic actions were 
separated. 
 
Chen and 
Hambrick 
1995 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Organizational size: Large airlines -  car-
riers with annual operating revenues of $1 
billion or more, small airlines, or nation-
als, were those with annual operating rev-
enues of between $100 million and $1 bil-
lion. 
Deviating group norm: calculated the 
mean of a group as its typical behavior 
and a firm‘s deviation on an attribute was 
then calculated as the absolute distance 
between its own behavior and the average 
behavior for its group 
Action execution speed:  time difference be-
tween the date the firm publicly announced or 
acknowledged the intended action and the date 
that action began to be executed . 
Action visibility: Measured by the number of 
lines Aviation Daily devoted to reporting) 
Response visibility: Measured by the number 
of lines Aviation Daily devoted to reporting 
the action 
 
DV2 
Organizational performance: (Deviating 
group norm) index composed of two market-
related and two profit-related performance 
measures: (1) Net market share change and 
percentage market share change (net market 
share change/initial market share. (2) Profit 
margin  and total operating profit per revenue 
passenger mile   
 
 80 
Gimeno and 
Woo 1996 
 
Annual Competi-
tive 
repertoire 
Strategic similarity: Pairwise similarity of 
1. DOT classification of airline size. 
2. Date of founding (those founded within 
similar timeframes will have similar strat-
egies). 
3. Euclidian distance of seven different 
strategic variables such as average pre-
mium over standard industry fare level 
and direct flights over all flights. 
Multimarket contact: 
The number of contacts outside the air-
lines major market where two firms also 
compete?? 
 
  Intensity of rivalry.  Average price charged 
by a firm to passengers or revenue per passen-
ger mile. 
 
Audia, 
Locke, and 
Smith 2000 
(Study 1 on-
ly) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annual NA Radical environmental change: deregu-
lation 
Past performance: deviation from the in-
dustry median for return on sales and re-
turn on assets was computed in each of the 
five years and then averaged. 
Change in performance after the envi-
ronmental change: same measure used 
for past performance to calculate perfor-
mance in the five years after the environ-
mental change. Then a difference measure 
was computed subtracting performance 
before deregulation from performance af-
terward. 
 
 
 
Strategic persistence:  (IV performance)  
stability (measured by the variance of the indi-
cator annually) of financial and operational ra-
tios that express the strategic position of a 
company. For example, R&D expenditure di-
vided by total revenues is a classic indicator of 
a company‘s R&D intensity. These are indus-
try specific. 
 
Performance: (IV strategic persistence) re-
turn on sales and return on assets 
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Annual Ac-
tion/Reac
tion 
Dyad 
 
Reper-
toire 
Similarity of firm resources: includes 
experience resources (the number of years 
it has operated in the market) and resource 
position relative to its rivals (Euclidean 
distance based on the three resource di-
mensions of technological intensity, size, 
and market-specific experience). 
Multimarket contact: number of contacts 
outside the airlines major market where 
two firms also compete 
Strategic frequency: percentage of all moves 
in a market that are undertaken by the focal 
firm 
Time to move: lag time in days between a 
focal firm‘s move and the most recent preced-
ing move of any of its market rivals 
 
Ferrier, 
MacFhion-
nlaoich, 
Smith, and 
Grimm 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annual Reper-
toire 
Top management team heterogeneity 
Altman’s Z-score score: weighted com-
posite of financial indicators relating to 
profitability, revenue, debt/equity, slack 
resources, and market return. 
Market share erosion: negative year to 
year gain in percent of firm sales to indus-
try total sales. 
Competition-buffered industry envi-
ronment:  three factor measure: industry 
growth rate for each industry-year (year t) 
was calculated as the percentage change in 
industry gross sales from that of the pre-
vious year (year t-1) for each 4-digit SIC 
industry.  Industry concentration used a 
Herfindahl index for each 4-digit SIC in-
dustry 
Competitive aggressiveness: number of ac-
tions carried out by a firm in a given year di-
vided by the speed/delay.  The latter half was 
calculated as the annual average of the number 
of days elapsed between the dates of each 
competitive action carried out in a given year 
by the  number 1 firm and the dates of the 
competitive action carried out by the  number 
2 firm that chronologically precede them. 
 
Mas-Ruiz, 
Gonzalbez 
and Ruiz-
Moreno 2005 
  Three, size-defined, strategic groups:  
large banks (national scope), whose dis-
tinctive characteristic is their extensive 
branch network; 
Rivalry instigation: ratio of ‗number of pri-
mary movements (as opposed to response 
movements) of a company in a year/total num-
ber of movements 
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Medium size banks (regional scope), 
which have a significant presence in a few 
local markets; and smaller banks which 
are to a greater or lesser extent functional-
ly or geographically specialized in one lo-
cal market. 
 
Competitive activity: number of competitive 
movements (including actions and responses) 
of an entity 
Propensity to launch new products: 
if a company is inclined to introduce new 
products. It is measured as ‗percentage of 
movements of new product launch (actions 
and responses)/total number of movements of 
an entity 
Speed of response: average delay time, in 
days, of the responses of an entity to the ac-
tions of its competitors 
Imitation of a response to an action: reflects 
the degree of duplication implied in each re-
sponse 
 
Gnyawali, 
He, and 
Madhavan 
2006 
 
 
Two 
years 
Competi-
tive Re-
pertoire 
Measures of co-opetition 
Network centrality - normalized infor-
mation centrality as calculated by UciNet. 
Structural autonomy  - calculated by re-
versing the sign of the constraint measure 
as implemented in UCINET 
 
Moderator: 
Market diversity: inverse of each firm‘s 
proportion of sales from the steel industry 
Centrality x Market diversity (Struc-
tural autonomy  x Market diversity 
(Competitive variety,  Competitive activi-
ty) 
 
Competitive activity: the total number of 
competitive actions undertaken by a firm - re-
flects the scale of competitive behavior.  To 
control for the stimulant effect of other firms‘ 
competitive activity on a focal firm each firm‘s 
score was converted to a z-score 
Competitive variety: the range or diversity of 
competitive actions - reflects the scope of 
competitive behavior. Herfindahl-type index of 
simplicity of calculated over the all different 
action categories 
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Annual Competi-
tive Re-
pertoire 
Nonredundancy of ties: used UCINET 6 
to compute Burt‘s (1992) measure of effi-
ciency 
Degree centrality: computed degree cen-
trality measure for each firm by counting 
the total number of newly formed al-
liances with partners in a given year 
Alliance variety: Shannon‘s (1948) di-
versity index: Adj. hannon‘s Diversity in-
dex =- ∑  pi{ln(pi)}- (s-1)/2n, where n 
denotes automaker‘s total number of al-
liances; pi = ni/n, which denotes the de-
gree of concentration of alliance type i 
(i=1, 2, …,7); and s=7, which denotes the 
number of alliance types (i.e., distribution, 
information technology/management, 
supply/logistics, manufacturing, 
R&D/technology, marketing, and finance) 
Alliance diversity x nonredundancy of 
ties 
 
Competitive repertoire intensity: (Nonre-
dundancy of ties, Degree centrality, Alliance 
variety, Alliance diversity x nonredundancy 
of ties) log of the total number of newly 
created competitive actions, regardless of type, 
carried out in a given year. 
 
Competitive repertoire complexity (Nonre-
dundancy of ties, Degree centrality, Alliance 
variety, Alliance diversity x nonredundancy 
of ties) Herfindahl-type index of simplicity of 
calculated over the all different action catego-
ries 
 
Zhang 2007 
(Working 
Paper) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quarters Competi-
tive In-
tensity 
Equity level: airline‘s total shareholder 
equity divided by its total assets 
Earnings pressure: difference between 
the analyst consensus forecast of firms‘ 
earnings per share (EPS) and firms‘ cur-
rent EPS 
Free cash flow level: average free cash 
flow (income before interest and taxes 
plus depreciation and amortization) di-
vided by average total assets 
Competition intensity: measured by a scale 
called ―yield‖ -  average ticket price that an 
airline charges in a city-pair route, divided by 
the distance of the route 
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One time 
ques-
tionnaire 
FMO Appropriability measures 
Intellectual property rights – patents, cop-
yrights, trademarks, utility models and de-
signs, and trade secret protection 
Tacitness of knowledge is measured with 
ten statements describing the products and 
processes of the responding company - 
cover different dimensions of tacitness, 
namely codifiability, teachability, com-
plexity, system dependence, and product  
observability. 
First-mover orientation-  five item question-
naire (subjective) that measure how significant 
it is for the respondent to act early, whether the 
respondent experiences the firm as an initiator 
or a follower, and the desire of the firm to in-
vest in new industries. 
 
Economic 
(Studies ex-
amining per-
formance 
based on cha-
racteristic of 
competitive 
actions) 
 
    
Caves and 
Porter 1978 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annual  Leader-challenger action dissimilarity: 
measured between-firm action differentia-
tion, or the extent to which leaders and 
challengers differed in the actions each 
carried out. This dimension is captured by 
using a single dummy variable con-
structed from a composite of several 
dummy variables that indicate whether the 
company is the same or different than 
competitors in markets served, breadth of 
product line, marketing expense service 
Relative share instability: absolute value of 
percentage point change of share divided by 
the initial shares and summed. 
Absolute share instability: absolute value of 
percentage point change of share. 
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quality and product image, vertical inte-
gration, product quality, product price, 
and direct production cost. 
 
Bettis and 
Weeks 1987 
Monthly Event   
Individual event announcements 
 
Cumulative abnormal stock returns: com-
puted the day the event occurred and the two 
previous trading days and summed.  Summed 
at the end of complete strategic interaction.  
Risk adjusted return in excess of the S&P 500 
Hambrick 
and D’Aveni 
1988 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annual  Domain initiative: 
new domains: sum of four indicators of 
initiative for a given year: 
- the number of wholly owned sub-
units acquired 
- the number of wholly owned sub-
units formed (foreign subsidiaries, 
new product divisions, etc.) 
- the number of partially owned 
units acquired or formed (e.g., 
joint ventures, minority owner-
ships 
- the number of new 4-digit SICS 
added 
- location growth: annual percentage 
change in one of these indicators 
for each firm - the number of 
stores (retail), number of routes 
(airlines), number of terminals 
(trucking) 
Strategic vacillation: variability of the 
Matched pairs of bankrupt or not firms 
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firms‘ domain initiatives over time. The 
coefficient of variation (variance divided 
by the mean; we added .O1 to both terms 
to allow inclusion of zero scores) for each 
of the two indicators of initiative 
Environmental carrying capacity: 
measure of real demand growth. Recorded 
the annual real sales growth for the top 
two (by sales volume) &digit SIC indus-
tries of each firm in each year. Then, in 
the absence of specific volume break-
downs, assigned a weight of .67 to the 
demand growth for the firm‘s primary line 
of business and .33 for the second line of 
business and added the two scores togeth-
er to obtain an overall demand-growth in-
dicator. 
Slack: 
- equity-to-debt ratio 
- working capital 
Performance: after-tax return on total as-
sets 
 
 
Miles, Snow, 
and Sharf-
man 1993 
 
 
 
Miles, Snow, 
Annual NA Industry Level Strategic variety.  Uses 3 
factors: 
1. Marketing factor – ratio of advertising 
to sales 
2. Capital intensity factor – dollar value 
of plant, property and equipment per em-
ployee 
Industry performance: Accounting based  
ROI –Market based: change in stock price   
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3. R&D factor – ratio of R&D to sales 
Stage of industry life cycle 
Growth (Sales increase above 10% an-
nually), Maturity (sales increases of 1-
10% annually), Decline (sales decreases 
annually) 
Level of foreign competition 
Ratio of imports to total new shipments 
Dooley, Fow-
ler, and Mil-
ler 1996 
 
  Industry Level Strategic variety.  Uses 3 
factors: 
1. Marketing factor – ratio of advertising 
to sales 
2. Capital intensity factor – dollar value 
of plant, property and equipment per em-
ployee 
3. R&D factor – ratio of R&D to sales 
 
Industry performance: 
Return on investment 
 
Ferrier, 
Smith, and 
Grimm 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annual Competi-
tive Re-
pertoire 
Total competitive activity: number of to-
tal new actions for the leader minus the 
number of total new actions for the chal-
lenger annually. 
Action timing: time elapsed, measured in 
days, between the date of a competitive 
action carried out by the leader and the 
date of a preceding competitive action car-
ried out by the challenger. The annual av-
erage was used. 
Action repertoire simplicity: Herfindahl-
type index of simplicity of calculated over 
six different action categories 
Leader-challenger action dissimilarity: 
Erosion or loss of market leadership: meas-
ured two different: the continuous change in 
the market share gap in a given year between 
leader and challenger and as a discrete variable 
indicating whether or not the leader was deth-
roned 
 
 
 88 
Ferrier, 
Smith, and 
Grimm 1999 
(cont.) 
 
 
summed squared differences in the pro-
portions of competitive actions carried out 
across all action categories for each indus-
try-year.  Our paper uses this calculation 
for strategic heterogeneity. 
Lee, Smith, 
Grimm, and 
Schomburg 
2000 
 
Event Action-
reaction 
Move timing: the number of days elapsed 
between the date of the new product in-
troduction and the date of each imitation 
Move order: temporal rank position of an 
imitator compared with the first mover 
and other imitators. The first mover is des-
ignated as order 1, the second mover is 
designated as order 2, and subsequent lag-
gards are designated in the same manner 
 
 
Standardized cumulative abnormal stock 
returns: computed for a three day window in-
cluding the day before and the day after each 
announcement and the end of each action se-
quence.  The excess return is the risk adjusted 
return in excess of the S&P 500, and this re-
turn was The daily excess returns for common 
stocks are obtained for the period beginning 
260 days prior to the announcement of a new 
product move 
to 60 days past. The event window of 60 days 
before and 60 days after the event was ana-
lyzed for abnormal stock returns. The metho-
dology used to test the hypotheses is based on 
the market model technique to measure ab-
normal stock returns. This technique regresses 
security returns 
against the overall return on the market  
Ferrier 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annual Attack-
level 
Attack volume: average number of com-
petitive action events composing each of a 
focal firm‘s competitive attacks in a given 
year. We use this but at the monthly level 
Attack duration: average duration of all a 
firm‘s competitive attacks carried out in a 
given year.  The end of an attack is when 
Market share gain: positive year to year gain 
in percent of firm sales to industry total sales 
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the competitor responds 
Attack complexity: Herfindahl-type in-
dex of simplicity of calculated over the six 
different action categories 
Attack unpredictability: uses optimal 
matching analysis to measure the extent 
that the order and pattern of actions car-
ried out by a firm and its rival differ from 
year to year 
Top management team heterogeneity 
Ferrier and  
Lee 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annual Competi-
tive 
Reper-
toire 
Strategic complexity: Herfindahl-type 
index of simplicity of calculated over the 
all six different action categories identi-
fied above 
Strategic heterogeneity: optimal match-
ing analysis to measure the extent that the 
order and pattern of actions carried out by 
a firm and its rival differ. Optimal match-
ing calculates the ―distance‖ between any 
two action sequences by accounting for 
the costs of insertions, deletions, and 
substitutions among all action types 
(known as INDEL costs) needed to trans-
form one action sequence to exactly match 
another. 
Strategic unpredictability: optimal 
matching analysis to measure the extent 
that the order and pattern of actions car-
ried out by a firm and its rival differ from 
year to year 
Strategic Intensity: average number of 
Standardized cumulative abnormal stock 
returns: computed for a two day window in-
cluding the day before and the day after each 
announcement and the end of each action se-
quence.  The excess return is the risk adjusted 
return in excess of the S&P 500, and this re-
turn was standardized 
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competitive actions that comprise the foc-
al firm‘s competitive attacks carried out in 
a given year deflated by the average time 
span of each competitive attack- each at-
tack sequence divided by the number of 
days the attack lasts.  The end of an attack 
is defined as when a competitor responds 
 
Thornhill 
and White 
2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annual Competi-
tive Re-
pertoire 
Strategic purity:  ratio of the subset of 
activities (or intentions) consistent with 
one strategy relative to the subset of ac-
tions consistent with another strategy. The 
relative emphasis, or ratio of strategic ac-
tivities, is the measure of purity. Two fac-
tors represent this latent construct as de-
termined from surveys asking respondents  
to rate the relative importance of 14 items 
for their workplace‘s general business 
strategy 
Operating margin: gross revenues minus 
gross expenses 
 
 
 91 
Thornhill 
and White 
2007 
(cont.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Operating excellence - the summed score 
for reducing operating, improving coordi-
nation with customers, reorganizing the 
work process, and improving measures of 
performance 
Product leadership - the summed score 
for developing new products and services, 
undertaking 
R&D, total quality management, and de-
veloping new operating techniques. 
 
Combination 
Studies 
    
Miller 1994 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Performance: average annual growth in 
sales and after-tax profitability (ROI, or, 
where this was unavailable, return on 
sales) for each period of analysis. 
Past performance - How a firm compared 
to its contemporary competitors. A period 
could only be classified as ‗post-success‘ 
if both average growth rate and profitabili-
ty were higher than the industry average 
for at least the last three years of the pre-
ceding period 
 
 
Environment 
1. Uncertainty or dynamism in the environ-
ment is manifested by the amount and unpre-
dictability of change in customer tastes, pro-
duction or service technologies, and modes of 
competition in the firm‘s principal industries 
2. Hostility in the environment is evidenced by 
price, product, technological and distribution 
competition, severe regulatory restrictions, 
shortages of labor or raw materials, and unfa-
vorable demographic trends (e.g. shrinking 
markets) 
3. Heterogeneity in the environment is evi-
denced by differences in competitive tactics, 
customers tastes, product lines, channels of 
distribution, etc. across the firm‘s respective 
markets. These differences are only significant 
to the extent that they require different market-
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ing, production or administrative practices 
 
Structure 
4. Controls monitor the internal trends and in-
cidents relevant to organizational performance. 
M.I.S., employee performance appraisals, 
quality controls, cost and profit centers, bud-
geting and cost accounting are types of control 
devices. Score high if there is much emphasis 
on such controls. 
5. Internal communications reflect the open-
ness and fidelity of information channels in the 
organization. A high score is given when in-
formation reaches decision-makers quickly, 
when it is relevant and undistorted, and when 
communication flows readily in top-down, 
bottom-up, and lateral directions 
6. Centralization of strategy-making power in-
volves the distribution of power for making 
strategic decisions regarding acquisitions, di-
versification, major new product introductions, 
long-term goals, etc. Centralization is high if 
the top executive alone makes most of the de-
cisions with a minimum of consultation, low if 
middle managers determine strategies by the 
default or intent of top executives (general 
manager and up) 
7. Delegation of operating authority concerns 
the amount of authority transferred to lower 
and middle levels of management (any parties 
below vice president) for administration of the 
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day-to-day operation of the business. Operat-
ing decisions involve equipment replacement, 
production planning, adjusting prices of goods, 
inventory purchases, hiring of lower-level 
personnel, etc. 
8. Technocratization is evidenced by the num-
ber of highly trained staff specialists and pro-
fessionally qualified people (accountants, en-
gineers, scientists, doctors) as a percentage of 
number of employees 
9. Organizational differentiation measures the 
degree of difference among organizational di-
visions or departments in terms of their overall 
goals, marketing and production methods, and 
decision-making styles. The more disparate the 
divisions, the higher the score. Even function-
ally organized firms with only one division 
may have high levels of differentiation if there 
exist many different approaches to marketing, 
production and other activities 
within different departments 
Strategy-making Process 
10: Proactiveness of decisions is determined 
by whether or not a firm shapes its environ-
ment by introducing new products, technolo-
gies, administrative techniques, etc. A reactive 
firm follows the leader while a proactive firm 
is the first to act 
11. Product market innovation. Does the firm 
seem particularly innovative in terms of the 
number or novelty of new products and servic-
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es introduced and new markets entered? 
12. Risk-taking. Is there evidence that top 
managers are risk averse (score low), or does 
the firm frequently make large and risky re-
source commitments, commitments that have a 
reasonable chance of costly failure? 
13. Scanning involves the search for problems 
and opportunities in the external environment 
of the firm. Firms are to be scored in terms of 
the amount of scanning performed on consum-
er tastes, competition, technological and ad-
ministrative developments, etc. 
14. Analysis of major decisions. Do decision-
makers devote much reflective thought and 
deliberation to a problem and the array of pro-
posed responses? Time spent on correlating 
symptoms to get at the root cause of problems 
and effort spent on generating solutions (good 
or bad) are examples of analysis. A low score 
is given when there is a rapid and intuitive re-
sponse to an issue (this response may be ideal 
or the worst possible). Evidence of analysis in-
cludes time delays, frequent meetings and dis-
cussions, the use of staff specialists and the 
writing of lengthy reports 
15. Multiplexity of decisions. Do top managers 
address a broad or narrow range of factors in 
making strategic decisions? For example, in 
deciding whether to acquire a company, a mul-
tiplex strategist would consider marketing, fi-
nancial, production, demographic, administra-
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tive, and other problems, whereas low multip-
lexity would be evidenced by a focus, say, on 
marketing factors alone 
16. Integration of decisions. Are actions in one 
area of the firm complementary or supportive 
of those in other areas, or are they conflicting 
and mutually inhibiting? High integration 
would result in (or from) a concerted and well 
co-ordinated strategy while low integration 
might be manifested by fragmented or clashing 
tactics (e.g. acquiring new companies when 
there is inadequate ability to finance or run 
them, or selling products that compete 
against each other) 
17. Futurity of decisions concerns the extent to 
which the firm looks into the future in plan-
ning its strategies and operations. A distant 
time horizon (5 years) warrants a high score. A 
focus on crisis decision-making warrants a low 
score. 
18. Explicitness of strategies concerns the de-
gree of conscious commitment to an explicit 
corporate 
strategy (i.e. a set of objectives coupled with a 
number of stated means for attaining 
these). A low score is evidenced by unclear 
goals and muddling though. This variable 
was not measured in the questionnaires. 
19. Adaptiveness of decisions reflects the res-
ponsiveness and appropriateness of decisions 
to external environmental conditions. For ex-
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ample, an adaptive pricing decision would take 
into account competitive strategies, customer 
buying habits, government regulations, etc. A 
nonadaptive decision (score low) would neg-
lect an important set of external factors. 
20. Traditions. Does the firm often reconsider 
its strategies (low score) or are these tied 
largely to precedent? 
Chen and 
Miller 1994 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Event 
and An-
nual 
Action-
reaction 
dyad 
Action visibility:  three scales to assess 
how visible each type of attack might be 
to rivals (first two derived from question-
naires sent to top executives). 
- amount of industry publicity asso-
ciated with each move 
- likelihood that this type of attack 
would be publicly announced by top 
management. 
- number of lines of print in Aviation 
Daily associated with each move 
Response difficulty: five scales is the 
ease with which a competitor can respond 
in kind to an attack (first four derived 
from questionnaires sent to top executives, 
fifth, author derived). 
- estimated financial expense 
- disruption of staff and systems 
- amount of relocation of staff or 
equipment required 
- the need for complex coordination 
Number of responses: number of airlines that 
responded to an action 
Response ratio: all competitive responses di-
rected towards the actions of a given firm in a 
given year / the total number of actions made 
by that firm in that year 
 
DV 2 
Performance: (IV: response ratio) 
- total operating revenue per revenue pas-
senger mile (RPM) 
- operating profit per RPM 
- profit margin 
Standard and Poor‘s published stock ratings 
for each airline for each year. 
 
Interaction terms: 
Visibility x difficulty 
Centrality x difficulty 
Visibility x centrality 
Visibility x centrality x difficulty 
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among different functional depart-
ments 
- overall perceived difficulty of making 
the move 
Centrality of attack: the proportion of 
annual passengers affected.  Aggregate 
index for each action 
was obtained by averaging the centrality 
measures for each affected airline. 
Potential benefit of the attack: number 
of attackers‘ passengers affected by the 
action aggregated for all the actions made 
by a given attacker in a given year. 
 
 
 
Hambrick, 
Cho, and 
Chen 1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annual Action- 
Reaction 
Dyad 
Top management team heterogeneity 
 
Action significance: number of strategic ac-
tions (significant commitments of specific, dis-
tinctive  resources and are difficult to 
implement and reverse) as opposed to tactical 
(easy to implement, reversible actions) the 
firm took in a year, divided by its total number 
of actions 
Action noteworthiness: number of lines 
Aviation Daily devoted to reporting the action 
Response noteworthiness: number of lines 
Aviation Daily devoted to reporting the action 
Action scope: proportion of firm‘s revenue 
base  potentially affected by the action 
Competitive speed – 3 measures 
Action execution speed: time difference 
between the date the firm publicly 
announced or acknowledged the intended 
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action and the date that action began to be ex-
ecuted (standardized). 
Response generation speed: amount of time 
it took a firm to generate a response. 
The time lag between the day the competitor 
announced the initial action and the day the 
focal firm announced its response. 
Market share change: % change from pre-
vious year 
Profits: % change from previous year 
 
Miller and 
Chen 1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annual 
 
Competi-
tive 
repertoire 
Past performance: passenger operating 
revenue per available seat mile flown. 
Breadth of experience: number of differ-
ent types of decisions in the previous year.  
The lagged C and D indexes of simplicity 
Organization and environment:  firm 
age (natural log of years since founding), 
and size (natural log of number of em-
ployees) 
Market Growth: change in total revenue 
passenger miles for the industry 
Market diversity. Composite index of the 
number of airports served and the number 
of competitors faced by each airline 
Market uncertainty: Standardized total 
of annual number route entries by new 
carriers, route exits, and bankruptcies 
Competitive simplicity: three index measure. 
Range (number of types of actions), concentra-
tion (numerical emphasis on the most com-
monly employed types of actions), and domin-
ance (numerical emphasis on the single most 
common type of action) 
Range: number of different action types used 
each year 
Concentration: natural log (to account for 
small vs. large companies) of the standard dev-
iation of the standard scores across 21 types of 
actions 
Dominance: natural log (to account for small 
vs. large companies) of the standardized score 
of the category with the most action types/total 
number of actions. 
DV2: Performance – Revenue per available 
seat mile flown. 
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Moderators: 
Market uncertainty x Competitive simplici-
ty 
Market diversity x Competitive simplicity 
Young, 
Smith, and 
Grimm 1996 
 
  Horizontal cooperative mechanisms: 
(firm and industry level) business moves 
undertaken jointly by competitors. In-
cluded only cooperative moves that create 
mechanisms for interfirm communication 
but are not directly tied to a competitive 
activity-  equity arrangements, mergers, 
technology licenses, and participation in 
trade associations and technology consor-
tia 
Firm-level competitive activity: annual sum 
of each firm‘s moves 
Industry-level competitor activity (industry-
rivalry): aggregation of firm moves to the in-
dustry level minus the focal firm‘s own com-
petitive activity 
 
DV2: 
Firm Performance (Firm and industry-level 
competitive activity) return on sales and re-
turn on assets. 
Chen, Su, 
and Tsai 
2007 
Two year 
period 
Combo Relative scale. Rival: airline‘s available 
seat-miles divided by a focal airline‘s  
during available seat-miles 
Perceived competitive tension: survey meas-
ure that asked inside and outside respondents 
to evaluate the extent to which a given airline 
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Rival’s attack volume: the number of the 
rival‘s entries into the firm‘s routes from 
1989 to 1990 
Rival’s capability to contest: two meas-
ures 
 - Similarity: Euclidean distance between 
two airlines in terms of distribution of 
different types of aircraft 
- Salience: captures the extent to which a 
rival was a dominant player flying the 
aircraft that were vital to a focal firm‘s 
operations. The calculation of salience 
captured the strategic importance of a 
given type of aircraft to focal firm and 
reflected the share of this type of air-
craft owned by rival 
could be considered a focal airline‘s primary 
competitor. Informants were asked to identify 
and rank, from each airline‘s viewpoint, its top 
5 rivals from a list of all 12 other competitors. 
In the scoring scheme, the airline rated as the 
top-ranked rival of a focal airline received a 
score of 5; the second, a score of 4, and so 
forth. Those not included in the ranking re-
ceived a score of 0. Scores were then averaged 
over all responses. 
Volume of a focal firm’s attack: the firm‘s 
number of entries, among the 10,000 sample 
routes, into the rival‘s routes from 1991 to 
1992. 
 
Other     
Macmillan, 
Mccaffery, 
and van 
Wijk 1985 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Event  Product and organization characteris-
tics that affect response lags: 
- Visibility: extent to which the product 
launch was visible to competing banks. 
- Perceived potential: extent to which the 
commercial banking industry, when the 
product was launched, might perceive the 
product as having high long run potential. 
- Strategic attack: extent to which the 
new product directly attacked a major 
strategic market of the competing bank. 
- Radicality: extent to which the new 
product would be regarded as revolutio-
nary, requiring the development of ad 
Response lag: time it takes for competition to 
respond aggressively to a new 
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hoc procedures and policies. 
- Complexity: extent to which the new 
product required the organization of high-
ly specialized skills in order for it to be 
offered to customers. 
- Organization misfit: extent to which 
putting together the new product will dis-
rupt the existing political equilibrium 
among functions and departments 
 
Chakravar-
thy 1986 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Review 
and 
Theory 
Proposal 
of Stra-
tegic Per-
forma-
nce 
 Single Measures of Performance: 
Return on Investment, Return on Sales, 
Growth in Revenues, Cash 
Flow/Investment, Market Share, Market 
Share Gain, Product Quality Relative to 
Competitors, New Product Activities Rel-
ative to Competitors, Direct Cost Relative 
to Competitors, Product R&D, Process 
R&D, Variations in ROI, Percentage Point 
Change in ROI, and Percentage Point 
Change in Cash Flow/Investment (Woo 
and Willard 1983). The authors factor-
analyzed the 14 variables using the PIMS 
data base and isolated four factors which 
they named: profitability, relative market 
position, change in profitability and cash 
flow, and growth in sales and market 
share. Of these, again, the profitability 
factor demonstrated the highest factor 
magnitude. The primary variables that 
loaded on this factor were Return on In-
Composite Measures of Performance: 
Altman‘s Z Score 
Measures proposed to take into account all 
stakeholders: the transformation processes 
pursued by a firm can be classified into two 
broad categories: adaptive specialization and 
adaptive generalization (Chakravarthy 1982). 
Adaptive specialization is the process of im-
proving the goodness of fit in a given state of 
adaptation. The emphasis is predominantly on 
profitably exploiting the firm‘s current envi-
ronment, and generating a net surplus of con-
tributions over the inducements paid to the 
various stakeholders of the firm for their coop-
eration.  Adaptive generalization, on the other 
hand, is concerned with the investment of the 
firm‘s net surplus of ‗slack‘ resources to en-
sure its flexibility in the future ‗Excellent‘ 
firms in our sample were able to generate more 
slack resources than ‗non-excellent‘ firms (Ta-
ble 10). The former group also invested a sig-
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vestment, Return on Sales, and Cash Flow 
to Investment, with the first and third va-
riables being highly correlated. 
 
nificantly higher proportion of their revenues 
in research and development. 
 
Measures of slack: 
Generation of slack 
Profitability - cash flow by investment ratio. 
Productivity 
- labor productivity – sales revenue per em-
ployee 
- capital productivity - sales revenue per 
dollar of total assets 
- cashflow/Investment ratio 
- market to book ratio 
- debt to equity ratio 
 
Investment of slack 
- R&D by Sales ratio 
- Dividend Payout ratio 
- Working capital by sales ratio 
 
Smith and 
Grimm 1987 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Environmental uncertainty: deregula-
tion 
 
 
Deregulation x change of strategy 
Deregulation x innovation 
Strategy defined as 
Prospector innovation strategy: firms 
scoring highest on innovativeness 
Leadership strategy: highest scores on 
service quality, marketing focus, and pric-
Focused strategy (regulation): pattern of firm 
behavior oriented toward one or two specific 
strategic dimensions 
Unfocused strategy (regulation to deregula-
tion): pattern of firm behavior in which no 
particular strategic dimension is emphasized. 
Performance (Deregulation x change of 
strategy; Deregulation x innovation): aver-
age of ROI, return on total capitalization 
(ROTC), and return on equity (ROE) 
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ing 
Quality differentiation: firms that scored 
highest on the product dependability di-
mension and second on service quality. 
Contingency strategy: firms in the mid-
dle on all dimensions. That is, they were 
rated consistently ―average‘ 
Unfocussed follower: firms that scored 
low on all five dimensions. 
 
Strategic dimensions, with the indica-
tors identified in parentheses, are: 
- service quality (speed and re-
liability of service) 
- marketing focus (ability of 
marketing personnel to nego-
tiate contracts, be flexible in 
responding to special needs, 
and be knowledgeable in ship-
per‘s operations) 
- pricing (rail rates) 
- organizational innovativeness 
- product dependability (car 
supply, loss and damage relia-
bility) 
 
Dagnino and 
Cinici 2007 
(Working 
Paper) 
Dagnino and 
Theoreti-
cal Pro-
posal of 
Strategic 
Hetero-
NA Strategic heterogeneity: 
Tobin’s q: to appreciate the Ricardian 
rents the firm can earn thanks to resources 
and capabilities heterogeneity;  Tobin‘s q 
is the ratio of the market value of a firm to 
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(Working 
Paper) 
(cont.) 
geneity the replacement value of its physical as-
sets, the value of its intangible assets, ca-
pitalized Ricardian rents, and disequili-
brium effect 
 
Patents and R&D investments: indica-
tors, to determine the superior perfor-
mance as the consequence of the firms‘ 
diversity to produce significant innova-
tions and to defend those innovations 
from competitors. 
In particular, 
- investments in training for employees in 
R&D; 
- percentage of investments in R&D; 
- the percentage of employees in R&D. 
Mutimarket 
Competition 
    
Baum and 
Korn 1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annual  Market domain overlap: aggregate of 
the markets served by the focal firm with 
all other firms in the industry. 
Multimarket contact: for each route the 
number of routes on which each competi-
tor meet (or potentially meet) each other 
in more than one route is summarized, and 
then these contacts are summed for each 
airline.  This is then divided by the num-
ber of routes the focal airline serves mul-
tiplied by the number of multimarket 
competitors it faces on the route.  
Market entry rates: in the first year the 
Guide reported an airline as flying a given 
route 
Market exit rates:  first year an airline was no 
longer reported as flying a given route 
Baum and  Annual  Chance variables: Initiation of multimarket contact between 
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Baum and 
Number of markets served by firms: to-
tal number of markets an airline served at 
the start of each observation year 
Market entry rates: firm entries into 
competitor routes was defined as occur-
ring in the first year an airline was re-
ported in the OAG as flying one of a given 
competitor‘s incumbent routes. 
Capacity of the markets served: average 
size of the human population residing at 
the origin and destination (county or dis-
trict) of an airline’s routes at the start of 
each observation year based on the 1980 
Census of Population. 
 
Trait-based imitation variables: 
Size: Total available seat miles (―logged‖ 
to normalize the distribution) flown by 
airline in the prior year. 
Operational performance passenger 
load factor (revenue passenger- 
miles/available-seat-miles) 
 
Vicarious learning, experiential learn-
ing, and selective search variables: 
 
Route significance: its centrality to an 
airline‘s network of 
routes. The proportion of an airline routes 
that connected with its competitors routes. 
Multimarket contact: 
focal firm and competitor: dichotomous 
measure coded 0 prior to initiation of multi-
market contact in a given dyad, If a firm acted 
to initiate multimarket contact, this variable 
was coded 1 for that firm and remained 0 for 
the other. If both firms in a 
dyad took actions that would create multimar-
ket contact at the same time, the variable was 
coded 1 for both. 
 
Expansion of multimarket contact between 
focal firm and competitor: 
Dichotomous coded 0 for firms in all dyads 
having already established 
multimarket contact. If a firm acted to increase 
the number of market contacts in a dyad, it 
was coded 1 for that firm and left coded 0 for 
the other firm in the dyad. If both firms in a 
dyad acted simultaneously to increase their 
number the variable was coded 1 for both. 
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Baum and 
 for each route the number of routes on 
which each competitor meet (or potential-
ly meet) each other in more than one route 
is summarized, and then these contacts are 
summed for each airline.  This is then di-
vided by the number of routes the focal 
airline serves multiplied by the number of 
multimarket competitors it faces on the 
route. For example, on route 2-3, Bold has 
one multimarket competitor (Dash), which 
it meets in three routes. Therefore, since 
Bold serves five routes, its multimarket 
contact on route 2-3 is 3/(5 x 1), or .600 
 
Multimarket contact in other dyads: 
average multimarket contact in other 
competitor dyads at the start of each year 
(contact in dyads not involving either 
competitor). Reflects the extent to which 
frequency-based copying of other compet-
itors‘ multimarket contact is the motiva-
tion behind the initiation and expansion of 
multimarket contact. 
Frequency-by-trait-based imitation: 
Disaggregate of the extent of multimarket 
contact engaged in by airlines in other 
competitor dyads according to their size 
and performance. 
 
Average multimarket contact by large 
(small) airlines in other dyads:  average 
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multimarket contact for large (small) 
firms in other dyads at the start of each 
year. . Large (small) firms were defined as 
those above (below) the mean total avail-
able-seat-miles flown by all companies in 
the prior year. 
 
Average multimarket contact by high-
performing (low-performing) airlines in 
other 
Dyads: average value of multimarket con-
tact for large (small) firms in other dyads 
at the start of each year.  High-performing 
(low-performing) firms were those above 
(below) the mean passenger load factor 
(revenue-passenger-miles/available-seat-
miles) for all companies in 
the prior year. 
 
Interaction terms: 
Average multimarket contact by airline i 
with competitors other than j 
Average multimarket contact by competi-
tor j with airlines other than i 
 
 
Gimeno and 
Woo 1996 
Gimeno and 
Woo 1996 
(cont.) 
  Focal firm’s resource-sharing oppor-
tunities: the set of markets served by a 
focal firm (except the focal market) di-
vided into two subsets: those with strong 
resource-sharing opportunities with the 
Efficiency: cost per revenue-passenger-mile ( 
the product of cost per available-seat-mile and 
the ratio of available-seat-miles to revenue-
passenger-miles, 
Intensity of rivalry: revenue per revenue pas-
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focal market (those markets that share an 
end-city, origin or destination, with the 
focal market) and those with weak re-
source-sharing opportunities (those mar-
kets that do not share an end-city, origin 
or destination) 
Multimarket contact:  count of the num-
ber of markets in which the airline met a 
specific rival outside the focal market.  
Since a focal market-unit can meet mul-
tiple focal-market rivals, ( 
the variable multimarket contact was 
computed as the average number of mul-
timarket contacts with all focal-market ri-
vals 
Interaction effects: Measured by splitting 
the previous aggregate independent varia-
ble into submeasures according to whether 
the moderating condition was present or 
absent in each nonfocal market. Multi-
market contact was split into two submea-
sures: multimarket contact (strong re-
source sharing) which measured the extent 
of multimarket contact in markets with 
strong resource-sharing opportunities with 
the focal market, and (2) multimarket con-
tact (weak resource sharing), which cap-
tured multimarket contact in the remain-
ing markets 
senger-mile, or the average price paid by cus-
tomers in an airline route divided by the dis-
tance between the endpoint cities, stated in 
cents per mile 
Profitability: (airline-route level) a Lerner in-
dex (similar to ROS) was used.  Calculated as 
(yield - cost per revenue-passenger-mile)/ 
yield 
 
Gimeno 1999 
 
Annual 
4
th
 quar-
 Spheres of influence: three dimensions: 
Market share dominance:  market 
Competitive rivalry: A common outcome of 
rivalry is decreased prices for the services pro-
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Gimeno 1999 
(cont.) 
ters only share of a focal airline route in terms of 
passengers transported 
Market dependence: percentage of 
overall firm revenues obtained by the 
focal airline-route 
Resource centrality: airline-route re-
liance on the firm‘s important ‗hub po-
sitions‘ in airports (percentage of over-
all firm enplanements that take place at 
either of the two cities of the city-pair 
market that includes the hub) 
Multimarket contact: number of markets 
in which the airline met a specific rival 
outside the focal market.  Since a focal 
market-unit can meet multiple focal-
market rivals, ( 
the variable multimarket contact was 
computed as the average number of mul-
timarket contacts with all focal-market ri-
vals.  Sum of reciprocal and nonreciprocal 
multimarket contact 
Reciprocal multimarket contact: for a 
challenger in a focal market is measured 
as the number of markets outside the focal 
market in which the challenger meets the 
focal-market leader and in which the foc-
al-market challenger is the leader 
Nonreciprocal multimarket contact: for 
a challenger in a focal market is measured 
bythe number of markets outside the focal 
market in which the challenger meets the 
vided by a firm thus yield to capture lack of ri-
valry. Yield was defined as revenue per reve-
nue passenger-mile, or the average price paid 
by customers in an airline route divided by the 
distance between the endpoint cities, stated in 
cents per 
mile. 
Market share:  passengers transported by the 
airline-route divided by all passengers trans-
ported in the market. 
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focal-market leader and in which the foc-
al-market challenger is also a challenger. 
Stephan, 
Murmann, 
Boeker. and 
Goodstein 
2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annual NA Multipoint contact: average percentage 
of markets (out of the total number of 
markets in which the firm competes) that 
a focal hospital shares with the firms al-
ready competing in a market that it could 
potentially enter. 
New CEO: binary variable set to one if 
the CEO had been in the position for less 
than three calendar years and zero other-
wise. 
 
Market entry: a value of one represented that 
the hospital entered the service market and a 
value of zero represented that they did not en-
ter. 
 
Strategic 
Groups 
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Strategic 
Periods 
Strategic 
Groups 
Strategic groups:  Classified as to 
business scope: 
- the range of market segments tar-
geted 
- the types of products and/or ser-
vices offered in the market se-
lected 
- geographic reach of the product-
market strategy 
Resource commitments: business-level 
deployments of resources to functional 
areas that are key to gaining and maintain-
ing a competitive advantage in target 
product-market segments 
 
Feigenbaum 
and Thomas 
1990 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Feigenbaum 
and Thomas 
1990 
(cont.) 
Stable 
strategic 
time pe-
riods 
Strategic 
group 
Strategic space: 
- levels of organizational strategy the 
components of strategic decisions 
(e.g. scope, resource deployment) 
- the time period 
Strategic scope variables: 
- personal vs. commercial lines 
- property/liability vs. life insurance 
- Firm Size - log (Personal net pre-
miums written (NPW) 
- product diversification - Herfindal in-
dex measuring the relative size of  
each line in the firm portfolio 
Resource deployment: 
- Expense ratio: ratio of underwriting 
expenses to net premiums written 
- Reinsurance: proportion of reinsur-
Performance: 
- Combined ratio -  (Incurred losses + Loss 
adjustment expenses + Underwriting ex-
penses + Dividend)/Net premiums written 
- Market share -  MS Firm‘s net premium 
written/Industry net premium written 
- Weighted Market share - indicates the 
firm‘s dominance of particular lines of in-
surance. 
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ance activity to total insurance 
- Financial leverage: ratio of net pre-
miums earned to policyholders‘ sur-
plus 
- investment strategy: investment cate-
gories are stocks and higher levels of 
stock are associated with a higher 
level of risk taking. 
Risk adjusted measures calculated for all 
variables by dividing each by its standard 
deviation 
Cool and Di-
erickx 1993 
 
Four pe-
riods 
each with 
a 
different 
configu-
ration of 
strategic 
groups 
were 
identi-
fied: 
1963-69, 
1970-74, 
1975-79,  
1980-82 
Strategic 
period 
groups 
Strategic distance: Euclidean distance 
measure for strategic distance that in-
volves group segment shares in the phar-
maceutical industry.  A segment example 
is cardiovascular, or cancer 
Concentration: three  concentration 
measures: the C4. the C8 and the Herfin-
dahl index 
Profitability: return on sales (ROS), computed 
as the ratio of net income 
before interest and taxes from pharmaceutical 
operations to total pharmaceutical sales 
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  Strategic scope variables: 
Product scope: 
- ratio of commercial and industrial 
loans/total loans 
- ratio of commercial real estate 
loan/total loans 
- ratio of residential real estate mor-
tages/total loans 
- ratio of time deposits/total deposits 
Geographical reach:  ratio of foreign-
owned deposits to the total deposit base. 
Product diversity: the percentage of non-
interest revenues/total revenues 
 
Resource deployment variables: 
Funding: ratio of net purchased funds to 
total assets. 
Capitalization:  the ratio of risk-weighted 
equity capital net of goodwill to total as-
sets 
Investments: 5-year annual average asset 
growth rate 
Provisions:. percentage of loan lease loss 
reserve/average loans and leases 
Loan ratio: percentage of loans in its asset 
base 
 
Performance variables: 
ROAA:  standard return on average asset 
measure 
Employee productivity: net profit by the num-
ber of employees. 
Relative P/E  ratio: price to earnings multiple 
 
Smith, 
Grimm, 
Wally, and 
Young 1997 
Annual Action-
reaction 
by stra-
tegic 
Strategic group: based on airline‘s dep-
loyment of its resources in the firm‘s cost 
position, marketing expenditures, man-
agement characteristics, and scope of op-
Competitive activity: total number of compet-
itive moves (including actions and responses) 
a firm undertook in a given year. Calculated by 
counting the number of actions and reactions 
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(cont.) 
group. eration.  No further definition given. 
- ‗niche-seeker‘, ranks lowest in the 
number of airports served. Also has 
the highest costs and the longest trip 
lengths. 
- ‗high-end flyer‘ ranks first in the por-
tion of each sales dollar allocated to 
marketing and also has the leading 
position in first class passenger reve-
nue. 
- ‗entrenched-dominant‘ - has the low-
est operational and marketing costs, 
serves the broadest number of airports 
and has the managers with the most 
industry experience 
 
for each firm within each year of the data col-
lection. 
Degree of rivalry instigation: number of first 
moves a firm undertook to instigate rivalry in a 
given year divided by the total number of 
moves it had taken (the difference between the 
number of first moves and the total number of 
moves is the number of times the firm was not 
moving first to instigate competitive warfare. 
e.g. was a follower) 
Proclivity toward price cutting: proportion 
of price-cutting moves (actions and responses) 
divided by the total number of moves that a 
firm undertook in a given year. 
Speed of response: average amount of time in 
days it took a firm to respond to a competitor‘s 
action. The amount of time was measured by 
the temporal difference between the dates of a 
specific competitive action and the response 
Tit-for-tat imitation: concurrence of the ac-
tion type and the response type. An imitation 
score was created to measure the degree of 
duplication involved in each response 
 
 
Pegels,  
Song, and 
Yang 2000 
 
 
 
  Competitive interaction groups - de-
rived from the interaction data to identify 
competitive interaction groups.  Using 
identified events, an action–response ma-
trix was constructed to identify competi-
tive interaction groups. The action–
DV: Airline load factors 
TMT Heterogeneity (Competitiive interac-
tion groups) 
 
Airline load factors – (TMT Heterogeneity x 
Competitive interaction groups) 
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response matrix shows the number of 
matched pairs between an initial actor and 
all the responders and carries the basic in-
formation for applying the clique parti-
tioning method. For example, Clique par-
titioning positioned firms  in group 1 be-
cause they are in direct competition in re-
gions where their services overlap. Any 
competitive action, such as a fare change 
or a service frequency change, would eli-
cit a response from those competitors di-
rectly affected by the initial action. 
 
TMT Heterogeneity x Competitive inte-
raction groups 
 (proportion of an aircraft‘s seating capacity 
that is actually sold or used, by revenue pas-
senger miles/by available seat miles 
 
Short, Ket-
chen, Pal-
mer, and 
Hult 2006 
Short, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One stra-
tegic 
time pe-
riod 
Strategic 
Groups 
Strategic Groups: 
Deductively defined strategic groups 
1. developing competitive advantage, 
research and development (R&D) 
intensity 
2. breadth of operations -  number of 
trademarks the firm holds 
 
The first dimension relates to a firm‘s me-
thod of developing competitive advantage; 
firms are expected to emphasize either be-
ing first to market or exploiting previously 
existing opportunities. The second dimen-
sion focuses on breadth of operations (i.e., 
narrow vs. broad) 
Inductively defined strategic groups 
Performance: 
- Accounting-based (i.e., financial)  per-
formance                          - return on assets 
- Market-based performance - Tobin‘s Q 
- Prospects for firm survival prospects 
for firm survival - Altman‘s Z, 
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Palmer, and 
Hult 2006 
(cont.) 
1. Scope of operations – 
- geographic scope  the % of do-
mestic sales divided by total sales 
- number of product types - the 
number of patents granted to the 
firm between 1991 and 1995 
2. resource deployment variables 
- physical resources - capital intensity, -
capital expenditures divided by sales 
- Available financial resources - current 
ratio calculated by dividing current assets 
by current liabilities 
- organizational size - total sales 
The inductive approach focuses on empir-
ically derived groups that often vary con-
siderably across industries. In contrast, the 
deductive approach is a theory-driven ap-
proach that can be applied to a wide varie-
ty of industry contexts 
Leask and 
Parker 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Leask and 
Parker 2007 
Strategic 
Periods 
Strategic 
Groups 
Definition of strategic groups: 
1. diversification measures of strategic 
commitment - importance of overseas 
markets and each firm‘s balance of phar-
maceutical vs. nonpharmaceutical busi-
ness activities, respectively 
2. differentiation - total promotional in-
tensity, research intensity, focus on the 
hospital vs. the GP market, chronic vs. 
acute drugs, and the degree to which two 
or three therapy areas dominate the portfo-
lio 
Performance: 
- market share - total firm sales divided 
by U.K. pharmaceutical sales 
- weighted market share  - recognizes 
that some companies may choose to 
dominate a few selected market seg-
ments -  measured by the sum of a 
firm‘s sales in therapy class i divided 
by the firm‘s total sales and multiplied 
by its sales of products in therapy class 
i divided by the total market sales of all 
firms in this segment 
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3. execution ability - measured by suc-
cessful new product introductions 
- changes in companies’ ranked market 
positions over the 5-year period 
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